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ARTICLE
IS THE REVISED UNIFORM




This Article considers the suitability of the Revised Uniform Ar-
bitration Act (RUAA) for adoption by the State of Alaska.  The
Article provides background information on the history of alter-
native dispute resolution in Alaska, including the use and devel-
opment of arbitration, and discusses the main issues that have
been litigated both in Alaska courts and across the country with
respect to the original Uniform Arbitration Act.  The Authors
provide a detailed review of the changes and clarifications in-
cluded in the RUAA and conclude that the RUAA should be
adopted by Alaska, as it is consistent with state case law and pro-
motes Alaska’s oft-stated goal of facilitating efficient and effective
methods of alternative dispute resolution.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Long before the advent of the court system and the now fa-
miliar practice of litigation, people were required to resolve their
disputes among themselves.1  There were no bureaucracies, judici-
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1. Mediation, for example, has existed for nearly 4,000 years.  Dana Shaw,
Mediation Certification: An Analysis of the Aspects of Mediator Certification and
an Outlook on the Trend of Formulating Qualifications for Mediators, 29 U. TOL.
L. REV. 327, 329 (1998).  Mediation was used in Biblical times and long ago by Na-
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aries, or other government officials resolving their disputes for
them.  All issues were handled locally.  Eventually, this private
method of dispute resolution was replaced with one where third
parties, sometimes judges, sometimes panels of “peers,” decided
how disputes would be handled.  These anonymous third parties
became the arbiters of the fate of the parties before them.  In re-
cent decades, the American trend has been to lean more favorably
once again toward these private roots of dispute resolution,2 toward
various alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, and par-
ticularly toward arbitration.3
tive American cultures such as the Lakota, Kiowa, Camanche, and Cheyenne.
Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of Mediative Art:
A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 890
(1997) (noting that the Gospel of Matthew encourages parties to first talk between
themselves and attempt to resolve the dispute); Robert D. Garrett, Mediation in
Native America, DISP. RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at 38, 39 (discussing the role of media-
tion in tribal legal systems).
Arbitration enjoys a similarly long history.  Commercial arbitration has been
noted as a dispute resolution option as far back as the times when Greek and
Phoenician traders were roaming the world.  See F. KELLOR, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION 3 (1948); see generally Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background
of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132 (1934).  It has been in use in the
United States for several hundred years.  See 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 4.3 (1999); Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial
Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 343, 346 (1995); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56 (1961).
2. See Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1031, 1033
(1996) (“There is a revolution taking place in this country—a revolution which is
enhancing the quality of the legal system.”); see also Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two
Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1993) (indicating that “[c]ompulsory
ADR is part of a movement over the last three decades to develop alternatives to
traditional litigation for the resolution of legal disputes”).
3. Arbitration has been touted by the courts as a speedy, economical alterna-
tive to litigation.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
280 (1995) (praising the inexpensive and speedy aspects of arbitration); Moses H.
Cone Mem’l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983) (noting that
the FAA calls for a “summary and speedy disposition of motions or petitions to
enforce arbitration clauses”); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Piece, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
39 F.3d 1482, 1488  (10th Cir. 1994) (favoring arbitration because of its expeditious
nature).  Scholars have praised arbitration for its flexibility when compared to liti-
gation.  See, e.g., Boyd A. Byers, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes,
67 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N, April 1998, at 18, 19; Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized
Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 204-05 (1996).
Others have noted that arbitration is a superior alternative to an overloaded court
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The earliest state-promulgated experiments with ADR
mechanisms in Alaska came in the form of conciliation boards in
rural areas.  Between 1975 and 1977, the Alaska court system used
federal funds to create and evaluate conciliation boards in six
southwestern Alaska villages.4  The Standing Advisory Committee
on Mediation (Committee), created by the Alaska Supreme Court
in 1991, currently works to establish and improve the use of ADR
by the Alaska Court System.5  The Committee, in conjunction with
the Alaska Judicial Council, made the recommendations that even-
tually led to the adoption of the current version of Civil Rule 100
by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1993.6  While the rule focuses on
mediation as the primary ADR mechanism,7 it also suggests that
system incapable of handling its increasing caseload.  Irving R. Kaufman, Reform
for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1990); see also James H. Schropp, Resolving SEC En-
forcement Matters Through Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 5 INSIGHTS
13, 14 (1991).
In contrast, several scholars have criticized the process of arbitration for vari-
ous reasons.  One author has noted that the “formal authority social custom
power” enjoyed by arbitrators can exceed that of judges since arbitrators are not
required to follow precedent, are rarely subject to appellate review of the sub-
stance of their decisions, and are not required to explain the basis for their deci-
sions.  Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power
in Legal Relationships (With Special Application to Unconscionability and Arbi-
tration), 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67, 136-37 (1997).  Another commentator has
argued that all forms of ADR, including arbitration, erode the guidance function
of laws, and that ADR lacks the procedures necessary for “quality decision mak-
ing.”  Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 15-27 (1987).  Even the claims of the courts that arbitration is a
truly speedy and economical alternative to litigation have been called into doubt
because of a lack of supporting statistical evidence.  Richard C. Downing & Pat-
rick R. James, Arbitaration of a Securities Dispute—An Overview for the Practitio-
ner, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 621, 624-25 (1991).  Downing and James add
that there are substantial, substantive disadvantages to arbitration, such as limita-
tions on discovery, inability to collect punitive damages or attorney’s fees awards,
lack of self-enforceability of arbitration awards, and limited grounds for appeal.
See id. at 625-26.
4. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE:
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE ALASKA COURT SYSTEM 31 (1997)
[hereinafter ADR IN ALASKA].
5. Id. at 30.
6. Alaska Civil Rule 100 authorizes parties to apply for and judges to order
mediation or other forms of ADR “for the purpose of achieving a mutually agree-
able settlement.”  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 100(a).
7. It is relatively clear that Civil Rule 100 is used primarily for mediation.  An
Alaska Judicial Council survey sent to all state trial judges showed that 71% of the
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other forms of ADR, such as early neutral evaluation and arbitra-
tion, may be used in the alternative.8
In addition to these general ADR efforts, Alaska has focused
on developing arbitration as a viable ADR option.  The Alaska
legislature adopted the original 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA)9 in 1968,10 amending it in 1972.11  In 1974, the Alaska Su-
preme Court adopted mandatory fee arbitration rules for attorney
fee disputes.12  The Alaska Bar Association originally proposed
these rules, requesting that the court adopt them.13
After adopting the UAA, the Alaska legislature has largely
left the task of shaping Alaska’s arbitration law or, more accu-
rately, filling in the voids of the original UAA, to the Alaska Su-
preme Court.  The Alaska courts have not been alone in attempt-
ing to plug the holes in the original UAA.  The court systems for
the vast majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the UAA14 have
engaged in routine battles over such issues as the arbitrability of
particular disputes, the procedures employed by arbitrators, the
remedies arbitrators may award, and the reviewability of those de-
cisions by state courts.15  In an effort to clarify, codify, and improve
responding trial court judges had ordered mediation at least once in the previous
two years.  ADR IN ALASKA, supra note 4, at 31.
8. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 100(i).
9. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997) [hereinafter UAA].
10. Act of August 6, 1968, 1968 Alaska Sess. Laws 232 (codified at ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.43.010–.180) (Michie 2001)).
11. See Act of September 5, 1972, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws 113 (amending
ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 by adding: “However, AS 09.43.010–09.43.180 do not
apply to a labor-management contract unless they are incorporated into the con-
tract by reference or their application is provided by statute.”).
12. Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 176 (1974).
13. See A. Fred Miller, P.C. v. Purvis, 921 P.2d 610, 611 & n.1 (Alaska 1996)
(quoting the 1973 resolution of the Alaska Bar Association recommending adop-
tion of an arbitration fee dispute rule).
14. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as-
serts that 49 jurisdictions have adopted the original Act.  See Uniform Arbitration
Act Legislative Fact Sheet, Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org/
nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
However, other sources contend that only 35 states have adopted the UAA.  See,
e.g., Noah Rubins, Time Limits for Confirmation of Arbitral Awards in the United
States, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2000, at 40, 43.
15. See generally Fairbanks Fire Fighters Assoc., Local 1324 v. City of Fair-
banks, 48 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2002) (arbitrability of issues); Miller v. Purvis, 921
P.2d 610 (Alaska 1996) (standard of review); Foster v. City of Fairbanks, 929 P.2d
658 (Alaska 1996) (remedies awarded by arbitrators); Public Safety Employees
Ass’n v. Alaska, 902 P.2d 1334 (Alaska 1995) (reviewability).
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the body of law on arbitration, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted a Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) in August 2000.16
This Article provides background material on the primary is-
sues that have been litigated regarding the gaps in the original
UAA and the codification of that law in the RUAA.  It also dis-
cusses whether the principles adopted in the RUAA are a good fit
under Alaska Supreme Court case law.  Part I provides background
information on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the UAA, and
how courts have addressed many of the issues that have developed
in arbitration.  Part II highlights the key provisions of the RUAA
that clarify the original act.  Part III discusses how many of these
issues have been addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court and
compares the court’s precedent to the solutions offered in the Re-
vised Act.  The Article concludes that the RUAA is consistent with
Alaska case law and recommends that the Alaska legislature adopt
the RUAA in substantial form to solidify arbitration law in Alaska
and bring the state in line with arbitration developments currently
underway across the nation.
II.  AN ARBITRATION PRIMER: THE ORIGINAL
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
ATTEMPTS TO FILL ITS VOIDS
Arbitration and other ADR processes have become widely ac-
cepted and are being used in an increasing number of sectors, in-
cluding commercial, insurance, employment, and family relation-
ships.  The centerpieces of arbitration are rooted in the FAA,
enacted in 1925, and the model UAA, created in the 1950s and
adopted by a majority of the states.17
A. Brief History of Arbitration
Until the early twentieth century, the common law did not
look favorably upon arbitration.  Courts had historically refused to
enforce arbitration agreements, likely due to a jealous guarding of
their own power to resolve disputes.18  Critics complained that arbi-
tration was susceptible to unjust results, making it easy for a
16. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2002) [hereinafter
RUAA].
17. Some states have enacted arbitration statutes that are unique to that par-
ticular state.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE CIV. PRAC. § 6.6.1 (2001); CAL. CIV. P. CODE §
1280 (West 2002).
18. See Joseph T. Mclaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United
States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 906 & n.4 (1996) (citing various cases).
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stronger party to take advantage of a weaker party.19  Nevertheless,
in 1920, New York became the first state to enact an arbitration
statute.20
The general opposition to arbitration diminished greatly with
the enactment of the FAA in 1925.21  The FAA sought to place ar-
bitration agreements on the same level of enforceability as con-
tracts, noting that such agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”22  Early U.S. Supreme Court case
law stressed that the FAA created a strong presumption in favor of
arbitrability of disputes.23  With the adoption of the FAA, courts
could no longer refuse to enforce arbitration agreements.24
The UAA was completed by the NCCUSL in 1954 and ap-
proved in 1955.25  Commentators have hailed the UAA as “one of
the most successful Acts” ever promulgated by NCCUSL.26  Deci-
sions by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1980s further contributed
to a boom in the use of arbitration in commercial disputes.27
Court-ordered arbitration, unlike other forms of ADR, has
been subjected to systematic empirical study for more than a dec-
ade.  At first, researchers assessed the value and effectiveness of
arbitration by comparing arbitrations to traditional jury or bench
trials.  They found that arbitration hearings, on average, were
shorter than trials, involved less attorney preparation time, cost
courts and private litigants less, and required less time in the
19. Zhoadong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 478 nn.20-22 (1990).
20. Id. at 479; see also KELLOR, supra note 1, at 10.
21. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)).  For a detailed examination of the legislative history of the
FAA, see generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 83-121
(1992).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
23. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-21 (1974).
24. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11.
25. The UAA contains language similar to that found in the FAA.  See Hecla
Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co, 617 P.2d 861, 865 n.3 (Idaho 1980) (noting that the
“proper scope of judicial review . . . does not vary significantly depending on
which act applies”).
26. Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing,
Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1 (2001).
27. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 1, at 347-48 & n.8 (discussing evolution
of decisions in the Court).
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schedule queue.28  Later research focused on the effects of arbitra-
tion on case processing and settlement behavior, concluding that, in
general, arbitration programs do not divert cases from trial, but in-
stead provide an alternative forum for cases that would have oth-
erwise settled without a hearing.29  Generally, litigants and their at-
torneys have reported high levels of satisfaction with the
arbitration process and its results, regardless of whether they won
or lost.30  Arbitration has become the primary method to resolve
disputes in many areas of the law.31
B. Primary Issues Addressed in Court Decisions Regarding the
UAA
The UAA failed to provide for many issues that are commonly
addressed in the realm of traditional courtroom dispute resolution.
These unresolved issues include procedural issues such as consoli-
dation and intervention and remedy-related issues such as attor-
ney’s fees and punitive damages.  Thus, the courts have been left to
decide whether such procedural or remedial options exist under the
UAA.  Since so much has been previously written on these major
points, this subsection will provide only a brief overview of the
major issues that have been subject to litigation under the original
UAA.
1. Arbitrability.  Challenges over what disputes are covered
by an arbitration agreement frequently fill the dockets of state and
federal courts.  The matter typically at issue is whether a particular
dispute is covered by the language of an arbitration agreement.
Generally speaking, if the arbitration is conducted pursuant to the
FAA, the courts will decide substantive arbitrability;32 if the arbi-
tration is under the UAA, the arbitrator makes those decisions,
28. ADR IN ALASKA, supra note 4, at 3; see generally Raymond J. Broderick,
Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217 (1989).
29. ADR IN ALASKA, supra note 4, at 3; see generally David B. Lipsky &
Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Feb. 1999, at 67; Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1994) (analyzing early
neutral evaluation in a California district); Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended Con-
sequences: A Cautionary Tale From New Jersey, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 229 (1991).
30. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RES. 19, 55-56 (1999); Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 29, at 1536; E.
Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 980 (1990).
31. See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 29, at 1487-88.
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particularly in situations where the arbitration agreement is am-
biguous.33  The key principle among these decisions is that the in-
tentions of the parties, conveyed through the language in the arbi-
tration agreement, should govern who determines arbitrability.34
While originally considered to apply only to contract claims, sev-
eral courts have held that various tort claims could be submitted
for arbitration.35
2. Arbitration Procedures.  One of the procedural holes in the
original UAA related to consolidation of arbitration procedures.
The UAA and the FAA, as well as a majority of state statutes, do
not provide for consolidation.  While state authorities are split on
the issue of consolidation,36 federal courts interpreting the FAA
have refused to allow for consolidation where the arbitration
agreement is silent on the matter.37
32. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 650 (6th
Cir. 1993); Magallanes Inv., Inc. v. Circuit Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1214, 1217 (7th Cir.
1993).
33. See, e.g., Orthopedic Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Sports Therapy Ctrs., Ltd.,
621 A.2d 402, 403 (Me. 1993); Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp. 468 A.2d 91,
96 (Md. App. 1983).
34. See, e.g., Elliot v. Inter-Ins. Exch. of Chi. Motor Club, 523 N.E.2d 1086,
1090 (Ill. App. 1988); Rogers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726, 731-32
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the arbitrability of the claim depended “on
the relationship of the claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause”).
35. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953 (1986) (citing cases
relating to the arbitration of fraud, negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and misuse of partnership property).
36. Those state courts that permitted consolidation of arbitration proceedings
did so on the grounds that allowing consolidation promoted efficiency in the adju-
dication of disputes and consistency in the final determination of disputes.  See,
e.g., Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208, 213 (Md. 1981);
Grover-Diamond Assocs. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 211 N.W.2d 787, 789-90
(Minn. 1973); County of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 72, 75
(N.Y. 1977); Exber v. Sletten Constr. Co., 558 P.2d 517, 524 (Nev. 1976).  Those
state courts opposed to permitting consolidation held that the absence of a provi-
sion in the arbitration agreement to permit consolidation was determinative.  See,
e.g., Stop & Shop Cos. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 304 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Mass. 1973); J.
Brodie & Son, Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 167 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Mich. Ct. App.
1969); Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 607 P.2d 856, 858
(Wash. 1980).
37. See, e.g., Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prods. Co., 189 F.3d 264, 268 (2d
Cir. 1999); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-77 (7th Cir. 1995); Am.
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v.
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Courts have also had to determine the role of the arbitrator in
evaluating evidence.  While the rules of evidence do not typically
apply to arbitration proceedings, courts have vacated arbitration
awards where an arbitrator’s exclusion of evidence has led to the
complete omission of critical evidence.38  Generally, though, “[o]n
questions of the admissibility of evidence, the arbitrator has great
flexibility.”39  An arbitrator is empowered to exclude evidence,40
and courts are usually reluctant to overturn an arbitration award as
long as the arbitrator considered the substance of the excluded evi-
dence in one form or another.41
3. Awards and Remedies.  An arbitrator’s power to award
punitive damages under the original UAA has been an issue of
considerable litigation and scholarly debate.42  The original UAA
and numerous state statutes are silent on punitive damages, leaving
the courts to decide the issue.  Generally, courts will permit an
award of punitive damages as long as the arbitration agreement
does not contain an express prohibition of such awards.43  Courts
are divided, however, on whether an arbitration agreement may
validly limit or prohibit the award of certain types of damages.44
Cont’l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v.
Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989).
38. See, e.g., Gevant v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.E.2d 574, 577 (N.Y.
1954); Smaligo v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. 1968).
39. Racine v. State, Dep’t of Trans. & Pub. Facilities, 663 P.2d 555, 558
(Alaska 1983).
40. See Atlas Floor Covering v. Crescent House & Garden, Inc., 333 P.2d 194,
197-98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that arbitrators did not abuse their dis-
cretion in refusing to hear certain evidence).
41. See Allsate Ins. Co. v. Fioravanti, 299 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 1973) (holding
that an arbitrator’s refusal to allow the insurance company to submit a memoran-
dum on the controlling legal issue did not deny the company a fair hearing be-
cause it had adequate opportunity to address the issue during the proceeding);
L.R. Foy Const. Co. v. Spearfish Sch. Dist., 341 N.W.2d 383, 386 (S.D. 1983)
(holding that an arbitrator’s exclusion of the company’s project manager as a wit-
ness did not deny the company a fair hearing because the arbitrator heard the
project manager’s proposed testimony from the company president).
42. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 35 (discussing punitive damages un-
der the FAA and state law, including a discussion on the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association).
43. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-63
(1995).
44. Compare Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,
1059-60 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitration agreements cannot proscribe an
award for damages that is provided by statute) with Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon
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Given the UAA’s silence on the issue, the primary factors in
determining whether punitive damages are permissible in a given
case are the language of the arbitration agreement, the guidelines
of the association providing arbitration services, and the state law
that governs the arbitration agreement.  For example, many arbi-
tration agreements may provide for arbitration according to the
rules of a particular organization, such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA).  The AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules
permit an arbitrator to “grant any remedy or relief that the arbitra-
tor deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement
of the parties.”45  Many courts have concluded that these rules
permit an award of punitive damages.46
4. Judicial Review.  The UAA provides for judicial review of
arbitration awards on several grounds.47  The key issues litigated
under the original UAA have related to arbitrator misconduct or
claims that an arbitrator’s awards exceeded his authority, either
under the UAA or the arbitration agreement.  Claims of arbitrator
misconduct under section 12 of the UAA typically involve allega-
tions of corruption, fraud, undue means, evident partiality, or re-
fusal to hear evidence as grounds for vacating an award.48  Claims
that an arbitrator has exceeded his authority usually arise in situa-
& Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[P]arties . . . can stipulate that pu-
nitive damages will not be awarded.”).
45. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, R-45(a), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Courses/rpid/rp04048.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 20, 2002).
46. See Kenneth R. Davis, A Proposed Framework for Reviewing Punitive
Damages Awards of Commercial Arbitrators, 58 ALB. L. REV. 55, 66 & n.99
(1994).
47. See UAA §§ 12(a)(1) (awards procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means), 12(a)(2) (cases of evident partiality, corruption, or prejudicial misconduct by an
arbitrator), 12(a)(3) (where an arbitrator exceeds the arbitrators powers), 12(a)(4)
(where an arbitrator refuses to postpone the hearing upon a showing of sufficient cause,
refuses to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise fails to conform
with the UAA), and 12(a)(5) (where there was no agreement to arbitrate).
48. See Henley v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 505 N.E.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (requiring vacatur of arbitrator award on several grounds, including the
arbitrators’ refusal to permit the plaintiff to respond to a motion, the failure of
one of the arbitrators to participate in the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration,
the improper characterization of the arbitrators’ decision as unanimous, and re-
peated unsuccessful attempts to conform the award to UAA delivery require-
ments).
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tions where an arbitrator decides a matter not submitted to him
under the arbitration agreement.49
Despite these provisions, courts have found that judicial re-
view of arbitration awards is extremely limited, reasoning that the
parties contracted for the arbitrator’s skills and abilities, not those
of the courts.50  Accordingly, courts have held that arbitration
awards are presumptively valid, with all doubts being resolved in
favor of upholding the award.51
III.  ADOPTION OF THE REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT:
CODIFYING THE COMMON LAW
After nearly forty years, the UAA was in need of some modi-
fication in light of the growing use of arbitration and the increasing
complexity of controversies.  The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) undertook a five-year
process to revise the UAA, taking comments and recommenda-
tions from many arbitration organizations, including the Tort and
Insurance and Alternative Dispute Committees of the ABA.52
During its annual meeting on August 4, 2000, the NCCUSL
completed drafting the RUAA.  This revision identifies the gaps in
the UAA regarding modern arbitration, the ever developing pre-
emption doctrine, and the expansion of e-commerce.  It also clari-
fies many ambiguous sections of the original UAA.53
49. Alaska’s arbitration statute provides that a party may seek vacatur of an
award if “the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”  ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120(a)(3)
(Michie 2001).  When an arbitrator decides an issue that was not submitted to it by
the parties, either through explicit language in the arbitration agreement or in the
choice of applicable arbitration guidelines, it has exceeded its authority.  See
Downing & James, supra note 3, at 645 n.186.  This “exceeded authority” standard
is invoked “particularly often.”  Hayford & Peeples, supra note 1, at 359 (discuss-
ing cases).
50. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (“It is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained
for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract,
the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the con-
tract is different from his.”).
51. See, e.g., Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 409 F. Supp. 233, 257 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Local 1466 Int’l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Columbus and S. Ohio Elec. Co., 455 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.
Ohio 1978).
52. See Andrew D. Ness, Legislative Update: The Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act of 2000, CONSTR. LAWYER 35, Fall 2001.
53. RUAA, prefatory note at 2.
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The RUAA also attempts to address many questions that the
UAA did not, such as the initiation of proceedings, criteria for ar-
bitration, the respective authority of courts and arbitrators, the
duty of the arbitrator to ensure the integrity of the arbitration pro-
cess, the powers of the arbitrator, the enforcement of arbitration
awards, the scope of remedies available, and the proper use of
technology.54  The RUAA empowers arbitrators to control the ar-
bitration process and promotes arbitration by increasing its effi-
ciency, while holding sacred a party’s right to freedom of contract.55
Although the RUAA does not significantly alter the UAA or
the arbitration process,56 it does make an effort to codify the com-
mon law that has developed in those areas that the UAA previ-
ously failed to address.  The RUAA is an effort to prescribe judi-
cial review while promoting increased arbitration, thus placing
arbitration on equal footing with traditional litigation.  Much of
what is codified in the RUAA represents an amalgamation of
trends supporting alternative dispute systems.
The RUAA gives primary consideration to the arbitration
agreements into which parties have entered, deferring to the con-
sensual nature of contract and affording parties free reign in com-
54. The prefatory note states:
[The UAA] provided no guidance as to (1) who decides the arbitrability
of a dispute and by what criteria; (2) whether a court or arbitrators may
issue provisional remedies; (3) how a party can initiate an arbitration
proceeding; (4) whether arbitration proceedings may be consolidated; (5)
whether arbitrators are required to disclose facts reasonably likely to af-
fect impartiality; (6) what extent arbitrators or an arbitration organiza-
tion are immune from civil actions; (7) whether arbitrators or representa-
tives of arbitration organizations may be required to testify in another
proceeding; (8) whether arbitrators have the discretion to order discov-
ery, issue protective orders, decide motions for summary dispositions,
hold prehearing conferences and otherwise manage the arbitration proc-
ess; (9) when a court may enforce a preaward ruling by an arbitrator;
(10) what remedies an arbitrator may award, especially in regard to at-
torney’s fees, punitive damages or other exemplary relief; (11) when a
court can award attorney’s fees and costs to arbitrators and arbitration
organizations; (12) when a court can award attorney’s fees and costs to a
prevailing party in an appeal of an arbitrator’s award; (13) which sections
of the UAA would not be waivable, an important matter to insure fun-
damental fairness to the parties will be preserved, particularly in those
instances where one party may have significantly less bargaining power
than another; and (14) the use of electronic information and other mod-
ern means of technology in the arbitration process.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Ness, supra note 52, at 1.
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posing arbitration agreements.57  Further, the RUAA empowers
arbitrators by providing them with the means to take control of the
parties and the arbitration process and conferring increased finality
on arbitration awards.58
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the most pertinent
changes and provisions embodied in the RUAA, focusing on
“new” provisions and “clarifying” provisions.  New provisions (in-
dicated by a “*”) are those that are new in comparison to the pro-
visions of the original UAA, largely reflecting the body of common
law that has developed in the nearly fifty years since the promulga-
tion of the original UAA.  The clarifying provisions (indicated by a
“**”) are those in which the RUAA merely eliminated the ambi-
guities under the original UAA and incorporated several updates
to the UAA as developed through case law under the UAA and
the FAA.
A. New Provisions
1. Section 9—Notice and Initiation of Proceedings.  Section 9
of the RUAA is a new provision requiring that all parties to a con-
tract be given notice of pending arbitration proceedings and the le-
gal claims involved.59  As basic as this notice requirement may ap-
pear, the UAA never provided any indication of the necessary
steps to commence proceedings.
Under the RUAA, a party initiates arbitration proceedings by
giving notice in writing to all signatories to an arbitration agree-
ment.60  The notice must contain the “nature of the controversy and
remedies sought.”61  Parties are free to contract regarding how no-
tice is to be satisfied and what content must be provided, so long as
the contractual notice provisions are reasonable.62  In the past, par-
ties initiated arbitration via regular mail by making a demand for
57. RUAA, prefatory note at 2.  This dedication to the party’s contractual
autonomy and ability to choose its arbitral fate results in a fairer outcome.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 9(a).
60. Id.  An example would be a multi-party construction contract involving
general contractors and subcontractors. When a dispute arises between some but
not all of the subcontractors, notice of arbitration should be provided to all party
signatories of the agreement and not just to the party against whom a claim is
filed.  Id. cmt. 4.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 4(b)(2) (“[B]efore a controversy arises that is subject to an agreement
to arbitrate, a party to the agreement may not . . . agree to unreasonably restrict
the right under Section 9 to notice of the initiation of an arbitration proceeding.”).
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF RUAA AND UAA SECTIONS
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act Uniform Arbitration Act
§ 1 Definitions* UAA § 17 for definition of “court”
§ 2 Notice* No corresponding UAA provision
§ 3 When Act applies* UAA § 3, § 20, and § 25
§ 4   Effect of Agreement to Arbitrate; Non-Waivable
Provisions*
No corresponding UAA provision
§ 5 [Application] for Judicial Relief UAA § 16
§ 6 Validity of Agreement** UAA § 1
§ 7 [Motion] to Compel or Stay Arbitration UAA § 2
§ 8 Provisional Remedies* No corresponding UAA provision
§ 9 Initiation of Arbitration* No corresponding UAA provision
§10   Consolidation of Separate Arbitration Proceedings* No corresponding UAA provision
§ 11 Appointment of Arbitrator; Service as a Neutral Arbitrator UAA § 3
§ 12 Disclosure By Arbitrator* No corresponding UAA provision
§ 13 Action by Majority UAA § 4
§ 14 Immunity of Arbitrator; Competency to Testify; Attorney’s
Fees and Costs*
No corresponding UAA provision
§ 15 Arbitration Process** UAA § 5
§ 16 Representation By Lawyer UAA § 6
§ 17 Witnesses; Subpoenas; Depositions; Discovery** UAA § 7
§ 18   Judicial Enforcement of Preaward Rulingby Arbitrator* No corresponding UAA provision
§ 19 Award UAA § 8
§ 20 Change Award By Arbitrator UAA § 9
§ 21 Remedies; Fees and Expenses ofArbitration Proceeding** UAA 10
§ 22 Confirmation of Award UAA § 11
§ 23 Vacating Award One additional basis for vacatur UAA § 12
§ 24 Modification or Correction of Award UAA § 13
§ 25 Judgement on Award; Attorney’s Fees and Litigation
Expenses*
No corresponding UAA provision for attorney fees,
but see UAA §§ 14 and 15 regarding judgment on
award
§ 26 Jurisdiction UAA § 17
§ 27 Venue UAA § 18
§ 28 Appeals UAA § 19
§ 29 Uniformity of Application and Construction UAA § 21
§ 30 Relationship to Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act* No corresponding UAA provision
§ 31 Effective Date UAA § 3, § 20, and § 25
§ 32 Repeal UAA § 3, § 20, and § 25
§ 33 Savings Clause UAA § 3, § 20, and § 25
* – New Section
** – Partially New Section
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arbitration or notice of intent to arbitrate with the assistance of an
arbitration organization.63  Most arbitration organizations64 have
their own methods of serving notice.  Some organizations require
more formality than others.65  This new initiation section provides
flexibility in the notice requirement, leaving it to parties to design
their own methods or rely on the ordinary practice of arbitration
organizations.
In the event no method of notice is provided by the contract,
parties are to rely on certified or registered mail, return receipt re-
quested and obtained, or by service as authorized for the com-
mencement of a civil action. 66
Any notice that is lacking or insufficient can be challenged.67
Challenging an arbitration award under the RUAA requires a
showing that a lack of notice substantially prejudiced a party.68  Ac-
cordingly, a party’s appearance at the hearing waives any objec-
tions to insufficient notice or lack of notice.69
2.  Section 12—Disclosure.  Section 12 of the RUAA creates
an affirmative duty for arbitrators to disclose any conflicts of inter-
est that may call into question the integrity of the arbitration proc-
ess.70  Because the RUAA is designed to fortify arbitrators with
63. Id. § 9 cmt. 3.
64. “Arbitration organization” is defined as “an association, agency, board,
commission, or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors, or administers
an arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator.”  Id.
§ 1(1).  This definition section in the RUAA is a new feature for which no corre-
sponding UAA section exists (except with reference to “court” at UAA section
17).  See supra Table 1.
65. RUAA § 9 cmt. 3.
66. Id. § 9(a).  The term “obtained” means that the receipt was returned to the
sender regardless of whether it bears the signature of the recipient acknowledging
receipt.  Id. § 9 cmt. 3.
67. Id. § 9(b) (stating that “unless a person objects for lack or insufficiency of
notice under Section 15(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing,
the person by appearing at the hearing waives any objection to lack of or insuffi-
ciency of notice”).
68. Id. § 23.  Section 23 is discussed in more detail infra Part III.B.5.
69. Id.; see also id. § 9 cmt. 6 (“If the appearance at the arbitration hearing is
for the purpose of raising the objection as to notice and such objection has not
otherwise been waived, the party’s appearance for the purpose of raising that ob-
jection should not be construed as untimely.”).
70. Id. § 12(a).  The UAA did not contain such a requirement.  In general,
most arbitrators have an ethical duty to disclose under the Code of Ethics for Ar-
bitrators.  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & AMERICAN ARBITRATION
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new powers that may or may not have to be clarified, it is impor-
tant that the RUAA also emphasize the corresponding need for
fairness in all proceedings.71
The new section 12 attempts to codify the developing common
law that arbitrators have a duty to disclose conflicts of interest.  In
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,72 the
U.S. Supreme Court required arbitrators to disclose to the parties
any interests or relationships that “might create an impression of
possible bias.”73  However, this standard has been much in dispute.
A split of authority exists among the states as to what is the appro-
priate standard for disclosure.  Some courts require more than an
“appearance of bias” but less than that required for “actual bias,”74
while others require a showing of “evident partiality.”75  The
ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS (1977).  The
RUAA requirement likely exceeds the ABA/AAA requirement.
71. See Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ill.
1992) (“Because courts have given arbitration such a presumption of validity once
the proceeding has begun, it is essential that the process by which the arbitrator is
selected be certain as to the impartiality of the arbitrator.”).
72. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
73. In Commonwealth Coatings, an arbitrator did not disclose his close finan-
cial relationship with one of the parties to the proceeding.  Id. at 146.  The suppos-
edly neutral arbitrator ran an engineering consulting business and served as a con-
sultant on construction projects.  Id.  One of his regular customers was a party to
the arbitration.  Id.  After an award was issued in favor of the party who had the
business relationship with the arbitrator, the opposing party became aware of the
relationship and sought to vacate the award.  Id.  The Court held that the arbitra-
tor was required to disclose the prior relationship in these circumstances.  Id. at
150.  However, the Court did not agree as to what general standard of disclosure
should apply.  Writing for the majority, Justice Black articulated a standard re-
quiring arbitrators to disclose any interest or relationship that “might create an
impression of possible bias.”  Id. at 149.  The concurring opinion by Justice White
required something more than a trivial business relationship to trigger the disclo-
sure requirement.  Id. at 150-51 (White, J., concurring).  The dissenting opinion by
Justice Fortas contended that there was no actual partiality based upon the evi-
dence presented.  Id. at 152-55 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d
141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264
(7th Cir. 1992); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir.
1989); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ol-
son v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 51 F.3d 157, 159-60 (8th Cir. 1995);
Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994); Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (11th Cir. 1982); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO
Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. 1997).
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RUAA resolves the ambiguities created by Commonwealth Coat-
ings by adopting a reasonable person standard for the purpose of
determining the existence of a duty to disclose.76
The question remains: “What type of interests or relationships
need to be disclosed?”77  This area has proven to be very fact-
intensive and the RUAA attempts to draw some boundaries with
its new language.  Section 12 prevents parties from arguing that ar-
bitrators do not have an affirmative duty to disclose78 and sets forth
“the affirmative requirements to assure that parties [have] access to
all information that might reasonably affect the potential arbitra-
tor’s neutrality.”79  Section 12 requires that an arbitrator disclose
any known80 facts likely to affect impartiality to all parties, repre-
sentatives, counsel, witnesses, and all other arbitrators to the pro-
ceedings.81  This is a continuing duty82 and arbitrators are required
to make a reasonable inquiry in order to determine whether any
conflicts exist.83  It is worth noting that there are some states that
76. See Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the standard is whether a reasonable person would conclude the ar-
bitrator is partial); McNaughton & Rodgers v. Besser, 932 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that the duty to disclose arises where a reasonable person is
persuaded that arbitration is likely to be partial).
77. See RUAA § 12 cmt. 2.  The Drafting Committee removed the require-
ment of “any” interest or relationship and substituted with “a[n]” interest or rela-
tionship, supposedly eliminating de minimis interests or relationships from be-
coming an issue.  Id.
78. Nasca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 P.3d 346, 349-50 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2000).
79. RUAA § 12 cmt. 2.
80. Section 1 of the RUAA defines “knowledge” as actual knowledge.
81. Section 12(a) of the RUAA provides:
Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as
an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all par-
ties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any
other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would con-
sider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration
proceeding, including: (1) a financial or personal interest in the outcome
of the arbitration proceeding; and (2) an existing or past relationship
with any of the  parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration
proceeding,  their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbi-
trators [sic].
82. Id. § 12(b) (“An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all
parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other
arbitrators any facts that the arbitrator learns after accepting appointment which a
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitra-
tor.”).
83. Id. § 12(a).
JOHNSON & PETERSEN_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
356 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:2
still have stricter disclosure requirements than those provided by
the RUAA.84
When in doubt, disclosure should be made using reasonable,
good judgment.  “The arbitration process functions best when an
amicable and trusting atmosphere is preserved . . . .  This end is
best served by establishing an atmosphere of frankness at the out-
set, through disclosure by the arbitrator of any financial transac-
tions which he has had or is negotiating with either of the parties.”85
It is better to determine an arbirator’s impartiality early in the pro-
cess rather than create a source of contentious dispute in the post-
award stage.86  Since the RUAA makes disclosure explicit, it is
likely to reduce, at least hopefully, the amount of vacatur litiga-
tion.87
The RUAA establishes two new standards for arbitrators with
respect to waiver of disclosure requirements.  A “non-neutral” or
“party-appointed” arbitrator88 may not have a duty to disclose if
the parties so provide in their agreement.89  However, if a non-
neutral arbitrator is required to disclose and fails to do so, there is
no automatic vacatur of an award issued by that arbitrator.90  The
failure to disclose must be shown to be prejudicial to the com-
plaining party.91  Even where a failure to disclose is deemed to be
prejudicial based on the arbitrator’s “evident partiality,” the gen-
eral outcome is to order a new arbitration hearing.92  Conversely,
84. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.6, 1281.9, 1281.95, 1297.121, 1297.122
(West Supp. 2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.056 (Vernon Supp.
2002).
85. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151
(1968) (White, J. and Marshall, J., concurring).
86. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1997).
87. See Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp. 392, 400 (D. Conn. 1994) (hold-
ing that courts should not encourage unsuccessful parties in their efforts to seek
insubstantial, tenuous relationships that might form the basis for some theoreti-
cally plausible yet completely unsubstantiated cry of bias).
88. See RUAA §§ 11 cmt. 1, 12 cmt. 5.
89. There is no prohibition on varying or altering the disclosure requirement.
But see id. § 4(b)(3) (noting that a party to an arbitration agreement may not
“agree to unreasonably restrict the right under Section 12 to disclosure of any
facts by a neutral arbitrator”).
90. See RUAA § 12(d) (“If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by
[section 12], upon timely objection by a party, the court . . . may vacate an
award.”) (emphasis added).
91. See id. § 23(a)(2); Creative Homes & Millwork, Inc. v. Hinkle, 426 S.E.2d
480, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
92. See, e.g., Umana v. Swidler & Berlin, Chartered, 745 A.2d 334, 339 (D.C.
2000).
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neutral arbitrators may have disclosure requirements modified, but
only to a reasonable extent.93  Thus, the NCCUSL RUAA Drafting
Committee (Drafting Committee) was mindful of party autonomy
and the freedom of choice in the negotiation process.94  Parties may
agree to higher or lower standards for disclosure and may contract
for the appointment of an arbitrator or arbitrators on a tripartite
panel.95
Another significant difference created by section 12 of the
RUAA is that a neutral arbitrator is “presumed”96 to act with “evi-
dent partiality.”97  “The reason ‘evident partiality’ is a grounds for
vacatur only for a neutral arbitrator is because non-neutral arbitra-
tors, unless otherwise agreed, serve as representatives of the parties
appointing them.  As such, these non-neutral, party-appointed arbi-
trators are not expected to be impartial in the same sense as neu-
tral arbitrators.”98  However, this presumption is rebuttable.99
If a neutral arbitrator fails to disclose a known, direct, and ma-
terial interest or a known, existing,100 and substantial relationship, it
93. RUAA § 4(b)(3) (stating that a party to an agreement may not “agree to
unreasonably restrict the right under Section 12 to disclosure of any facts by a
neutral arbitrator”).
94. See id. § 11 cmt. 1.  UAA section 3 provides for the appointment of arbi-
trators by the court.  It also provides that parties may select arbitrators in their
agreement.  UAA § 3 n.3.  RUAA section 11 maintains this feature of the UAA.
95. The Drafting Committee was aware that parties who select arbitration by
contract are foregoing a jury trial and accepting limited judicial review in ex-
change for a method of speedy resolution that costs less and provides for one’s
own choosing of a decision-maker, one likely having expertise in a given field.
Parties usually choose arbitrators based on their professional, business, or com-
mercial expertise, or their relationship to the parties.  See RUAA § 11 cmt. 1, § 12
cmt. 1.
96. Id. § 12(e) (“An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not
disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is pre-
sumed to act with evident partiality under Section 23(a)(2).”) (emphasis added);
see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997)
(“We emphasize that this evident partiality is established from the nondisclosure
itself, regardless of whether the nondisclosed information necessarily establishes
partiality or bias.”).
97. RUAA § 23(a)(2)(A) (stating that courts should vacate an award where
there was “evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator”).
98. Id. § 23 cmt. 1.
99. Id. § 12 cmt. 4 (“[I]t is then the burden of the party defending the award to
rebut the presumption by showing that the award was not tainted by the non-
disclosure or there in fact was no prejudice.”).
100. It appears that a past relationship would not support such a presumption
because there is a slight difference in the wording chosen by the Drafting Commit-
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is then presumed that the arbitrator acts with “evident partiality”
and any award is subject to vacatur.101  How big a role this rebutta-
ble presumption plays will depend on the types of interests or rela-
tionships involved and whether the standard for the presumption to
attach appears to be a high one.102  Some states impose even stricter
disclosure requirements on arbitrators.103
Finally, all challenges based on an arbitrator’s alleged imparti-
ality are subject to any contract provision detailing methods of
challenge and are considered conditions precedent.104  Timely ob-
jections are required before any challenge or review for vacatur is
initiated.105
3. Section 10—Consolidation.  The RUAA takes a major step
by adding an entirely new section related to the consolidation of
multi-party disputes and separate arbitration proceedings.  Section
10 provides that, upon motion of one of the parties, a court may
order consolidation of some or all claims in situations where there
are separate arbitration agreements or proceedings between the
same parties or where one party is involved in a separate arbitra-
tion agreement or proceeding with a third party.106  However, in or-
der to consolidate, it must be shown that: (1) the claims arise “in
tee regarding what is to be disclosed.  RUAA sections 12(a)(1) and (2) require the
arbitrator to have “a financial or personal interest in the outcome” or “an existing
or past relationship with any of the parties” before the award can be subject to va-
catur.  Section 12(e), however, requires the arbitrator to have a “known, direct,
and material interest” or a “known, existing, and substantial relationship.”
101. Id. § 23(a)(2)(A).
102. RUAA sections 12(a)(1) and (2) are worded differently than section 12(e).
103. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.6, 1281.9, 1281.95, 1297.121, 1297.122
(West. Supp. 2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.056 (Vernon
Supp. 2002).  On a related note, on July 22, 2002, the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange filed suit
against the California Judicial Council and its members.  Both arbitration organi-
zations are seeking a declaration that they are exempt from the California arbitra-
tor disclosure standards that were implemented in that state on July 1, 2002.  See
NASD, NASD Seeks Exemption from California Arbitration Rules, The Neutral
Corner, at http://www.nasdadr.com/neutral_corner/0802_default.asp (last visited
October 20, 2002).
104. RUAA section 12(f) reads:
If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of an
arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitra-
tors before an award is made, substantial compliance with those proce-
dures is a condition precedent to a [motion] to vacate an award on that
ground under Section 23(a)(2).
105. Id. § 12(c).
106. Id. § 10(a)(1).
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substantial part” from the same transaction or series of transac-
tions; (2) the presence of a common issue of law or fact creates the
possibility of conflicting decisions in separate arbitration proceed-
ings; and (3) any prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is
not outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or hardship
to the party opposing consolidation.107
Consolidation has been a source of controversy and conflict.108
There are few state statutes that address consolidation109 and most
arbitration agreements do not provide for it.  It is hardly a reality
that all parties are signatories to one agreement document, al-
though it does happen.110  However, consolidation has been re-
quired in some cases for various reasons implicating the interests of
efficiency in arbitration and the prevention of conflicting awards.111
The current trend under the FAA holds that where parties do not
expressly agree on consolidation there is no requirement to con-
107. Id. § 10(a)(2)-(4).
108. Id. § 10 cmt. 1.
109. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-
9-6 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2A (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-23A-3
(West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-60 (Law. Co-op. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-31(a)-(9)(2002).
110. See Hartford Accident Indem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance American Corp.,
246 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2001).
111. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 210 F.3d
771, 775 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that consolidation was appropriate when both
textual and practical arguments favored it); New England Energy v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the FAA did not pre-
clude consolidation when the agreement was silent on the issue and the state law
provided for consolidation); Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d
208, 217-18 (Md. 1981) (holding that a circuit court is empowered by the state
UAA to order consolidation); Grover-Diamond Assoc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n,
211 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1973) (holding that consolidation was appropriate
where parties chose the same arbitrator, the arbitration agreement did not pro-
hibit joint arbitrations, and there was no prejudice); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr.
Co., 558 P.2d 517, 524 (Nev. 1976) (holding that consolidation is appropriate when
evidence, witnesses, and legal issues were the same in both disputes and there was
no showing of prejudice); Polshek v. Bergen County Iron Works, 362 A.2d 63, 68-
70 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (holding that consolidation was appropriate
even without an authorizing statute because of common issues and lack of
prejudice); County of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 72, 75 (N.Y.
1977) (holding that a trial court was within its discretion to order consolidation
when there was a common contact to the two claims and consolidations would
provide a more consistent result); Plaza Dev. Serv. v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc.,
365 S.E.2d 231, 233 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that consolidation was appropri-
ate where there was no finding of prejudice).
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solidate.112  Despite the fact that a majority of federal appellate
courts have ruled against consolidation,113 the RUAA makes an ef-
fort to encourage the use of arbitration in multi-party scenarios
similar to judicial consolidation of litigation proceedings.114  Where
common issues of fact and law are present, section 10 allows courts
to order consolidation.115
4. Section 4—Waivable Provisions.  Section 4 of the RUAA
in effect provides that parties entering into arbitration agreements
are free to arrange such contracts as they wish, subject to minimal
prohibitions.116  As such, section 4 operates as a default statute and
should be referred to when analyzing the various ways of designing
an arbitration clause or agreement.117  No doubt there is the temp-
tation to craft an agreement heavily in favor of one’s own interest.
Those who do so should take caution because there is always the
increased likelihood of a vacatur challenge.
In general, the RUAA permits parties to vary their agree-
ments in any manner and at any time subsequent to the initial
agreement as long as the integrity of arbitration remains intact.118
112. See Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prod. Co., 189 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir.
1999) (“[T]here is no source of authority in either the FAA or the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for the district court to order consolidation absent authority
granted by the contracts.”); see also 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 33.3 (1999).  But see Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78
Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the FAA does not pre-
empt state law on issues of procedure, including consolidation).
113. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995);
U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Nat’l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Cont’l Grain Co., 900
F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Prospective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life
Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas
Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984); Rolls-Royce Indus. Power, Inc. v.
Zurn EPC Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1397881, at *6 (D. Ill. 2001).
114. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 210 F.3d
771, 774 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “a court can in appropriate circumstances
consolidate cases before it”).
115. RUAA § 10(a)(3).
116. Id. § 4 (“A party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration pro-
ceeding may waive or, the parties may vary the effect of, the requirements of [the
RUAA] to the extent permitted by law.”).
117. See id. § 4 cmt. 1.
118. See id. § 6 (stating that although the initial agreement shall be in a “rec-
ord,” subsequent oral or written modifications are permitted); see generally id. § 6
cmt. 1; Premier Technical Sales, Inc. v.  Digital Equip. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1156
(N.D. Cal. 1998); Cambridgeport Sav. Bank v. Boersner, 597 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass.
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The RUAA demands that parties to a contract be responsible for
their consensual arrangements.  There is no doubt that parties on
the wrong end of an arbitration agreement will challenge such
agreements or arbitration provisions.  Most will fail,119 but there is a
possibility for success where an agreement runs contrary to funda-
mental fairness, takes away statutory rights, or undermines an arbi-
trator’s ability to govern the arbitration proceedings.120  Section 4
explicitly prohibits parties from waiving or varying the effect of the
RUAA in a number of substantive areas.  Under the RUAA, par-
ties to an arbitration agreement may not contract so as to waive
their respective rights to seek judicial relief,121 to appeal,122 to be
1992); Pellegrene v. Luther, 169 A.2d 298 (Pa. 1961); Pac. Dev., L.C. v. Orton, 982
P.2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
119. See RUAA § 6 cmt. 7 (“Despite some recent developments to the con-
trary, courts do not often find contracts unenforceable for unconscionability.”).
120. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that an arbitration agreement can be invalid when one party promulgates
rules that are egregiously unfair); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding an employee’s discrimination claim not sub-
ject to arbitration where the arbitral forum is substantially limited by having to
pay a portion of the arbitrator’s fee); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134
F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding an employee was not required to arbi-
trate Title VII claim when the agreement limited his damages below the statutory
minimum); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 683
(Cal. 2000) (noting that an arbitration agreement limiting an employee’s remedies
under state anti-discrimination claims may be void); Engalla v. Permanente Med.
Group, 938 P.2d 903, 916-17 (Cal. 1997) (holding that a health maintenance or-
ganization could not compel arbitration when it fraudulently induced participant
to agree to arbitrate, misrepresented arbitration selection process, and forced de-
lays making participant waive arbitration right); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding an arbitration contract unenforceable because of persuasive procedural
and substantive unconscionability); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138,
152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding unconscionable an arbitration clause that was
one-sided, reserved litigation rights to employer but not employee, had shorter
statute of limitation for employee, and limited damages); Alamo Rent A Car, Inc.
v. Galarza, 703 A.2d 961, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding employ-
ment discrimination claim not subject to arbitration because it was not clearly de-
lineated in agreement as subject to arbitration); Arnold v. United Co. Lending
Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998) (holding unconscionable an arbitration
provision when consumer waived right to judicial review in consumer loan agree-
ment while reserving lender’s right to judicial review).
121. RUAA §§ 4(b)(1), 5(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in Section 28, an
[application] for judicial relief under this [Act] must be made by [motion] to the
court and heard in the manner provided by law or rule of court for making and
hearing [motions].”).  The bracketed sections are provided by the RUAA to ac-
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represented by an attorney,123 to file a motion to compel or stay the
arbitration,124 to seek confirmation of an award,125 to move to vacate
an award,126 or to request modification or correction of an award.127
Additionally, arbitration agreements may not limit the immunity of
an arbitrator or an arbitration organization from suit128 or restrict
an arbitrator’s power to issue pre-hearing orders,129 to issue sub-
poenas and permit depositions of parties,130 or to modify or correct
an award.131  Finally, contracting parties may not structure their ar-
commodate differences in initiating arbitration in different states.  Some states
allow the filing of petitions or complaints with or without motions or applications.
The terms “application” and “motion” have been bracketed throughout the
RUAA for states to substitute where appropriate and does not attempt to alter
the already established practice of each state.
122. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), 28.  The RUAA keeps intact the right to appeal as it ap-
pears in the UAA.  Appeals may be taken from orders denying a motion to com-
pel arbitration, granting a stay of arbitration, confirming or denying confirmation
of an award, modifying or correcting an award, vacating an award without direct-
ing a rehearing, or entering a final judgment pursuant to the RUAA.  See id. § 28
(a)(1)–(6).
123. Id. §§ 4(b)(4), 16.  Under UAA section 6, an attempt to waive right to be
represented by an attorney prior to the proceedings or hearing is ineffective.  The
RUAA is somewhat different in that it allows an employer or a labor organization
to waive the right to representation in a labor arbitration.  Id. § 4(b)(4).
124. Id. §§ 4(c), 7.  Section 7 is not a new section.  Authority to compel or stay
proceedings can be found at UAA section 2.
125. Id. §§ 4(c), 22.  After a party receives notice of an award, “the party may
make a [motion] to the court for an order confirming the award.”  RUAA § 22.
The RUAA alters the language of UAA section 11 regarding confirmation so as
to bring it into conformity with the terms used by the FAA.
126. Id. §§ 4(c), 23.  The RUAA keeps intact UAA section 12 on vacating an
award with one addition regarding insufficient or lack of notice as a basis for vaca-
tur, provided that the complaining party establish timely objection, substantial
prejudice, and no waiver of objection by appearance at hearing.  Id. §§ 9, 23(a)(6).
127. Id. §§ 4(c), 24.
128. Id. §§ 4(c), 14.  Section 14 is a new provision granting immunity to an arbi-
trator.  This follows the RUAA’s direction to empower arbitrators and enhance
the efficiency of arbitration proceedings.
129. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), 8.  Section 8 is a completely new section granting arbitrators
more authority.  The RUAA prohibits any waiver of or variance of an arbitrator’s
authority to preserve the status quo of property that may become the means of
satisfying a judgment (e.g., preliminary injunctive relief, replevin, attachment, or
sequestration of assets).  Note that section 4 does not prohibit parties from waiv-
ing or varying an arbitrator’s remedies at the award stage or post-hearing stage.
Id. § 21.
130. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), 17.
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bitration agreement so as to modify or alter the validity, enforce-
ability, or irrevocability of arbitration agreements,132 the jurisdic-
tion of a court,133 the judicial enforceability of an arbitrator’s pre-
award rulings,134 a court’s authority to award attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses for services related to confirming, vacating,
modifying or correcting an award,135 the uniformity of application
and construction of RUAA,136 the application of the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,137 the effective
date provisions of the RUAA,138 or the repeal date of a state’s pre-
sent statute adopting the UAA.139
Under section 4, parties are permitted to vary or modify the
RUAA provisions regarding notice of the initiation of an arbitra-
tion proceeding and the duty of disclosure on the part of a neutral
arbitrator as long as such modifications are reasonable.140
5. Section 8—Provisional Remedies.  Section 8 of the RUAA
empowers the arbitrator or arbitration panel to deal effectively
with the modern arbitration issues of multiparty claims and com-
131. Id. §§ 4(c), 20(d)-(e).  If a motion to the court is pending regarding
confirmation, vacatur, or modification, “the court may submit [a] claim to the ar-
bitrator to consider whether to modify or correct the award.”  Id. § 20(d); see also
id. §§ 22-24.  Further, section 20(e) provides that an award must be provided by
record and may be subject to confirmation, vacatur, or modification.  Id. § 20(e);
see also id. §§ 19(a), 22-24.
132. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), 6(a) (“[Arbitration agreements] are valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation
of a contract.”).
133. Id. §§ 4(b)(1), 26 (“A court . . . having jurisdiction over the controversy
and the parties may enforce an agreement to arbitrate.”).
134. Id. §§ 4(c), 18.  Section 18 is a new provision granting greater power to ar-
bitrators and requiring courts to enforce their rulings.
135. Id. §§ 4(c), 25(a), 25(b).  Sections 25(a) and 25(b) correspond to UAA sec-
tions 14 and 15 with a similar provision in FAA section 13 regarding judgments
and docketing.
136. Id. §§ 4(c), 29.  Section 29 is not a new section.  Uniformity of interpreta-
tion can be found at UAA section 21.
137. Id. §§ 4(c), 30.  This is a new provision of the RUAA intended to expand
coverage of arbitration agreements using electronic mediums.
138. Id. §§ 4(c), 3(a), 3(c).  Sections 3(a) and 3(c) govern the effective date of
the RUAA.  The exception is provided in section 3(b) where parties have entered
into a contract under the UAA and have the option to elect coverage under the
RUAA.
139. Id. §§ 4(c), 32.
140. Id. §§ 4(b)(2)-(3), 9, 12.  For a detailed discussion of the requirements of
RUAA sections 9 and 12, see supra Part III.A.1 (section 9) and Part III.A.2 (section
12).
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plex discovery.  This provisional remedy141 section was first envi-
sioned by the original drafters of the UAA, but was eliminated in
the final 1955 version.142  Section 8 assists the arbitration process by
placing more authority in the hands of arbitrators to handle pre-
hearing matters and reduces the opportunity for parties to resort to
the courts.  The Drafting Committee identified the need to prevent
the pre-arbitration dispersal of assets by a party fearing liability
and accordingly provided for provisional remedies prior to a hear-
ing that can operate to protect and preserve property.
Where an arbitrator has not been appointed, a party may re-
quest the court to enter a provisional remedy to secure property.143
After an arbitrator has been appointed and is authorized to act, the
arbitrator may order provisional remedies, including interim
awards, as the arbitrator finds necessary.144  When an arbitrator is
not able to act or cannot provide an adequate remedy on an urgent
matter, the parties may request a court to issue a provisional rem-
edy. 145  In such a case, an arbitrator can order a party to perform a
141. “Provisional remedy” is defined as “[a]n equitable proceeding before
judgment to provide for the postjudgment safety and preservation of property.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (7th ed. 1999).
142. RUAA § 8 cmt. 1.
143. Id. § 8(a).  Section 8(a) reads as follows:
Before an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and able to act, the
court, upon [motion] of a party to an arbitration proceeding and for good
cause shown, may enter an order for provisional remedies to protect the
effectiveness of the arbitration proceedings to the same extent and under
the same conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil ac-
tion.
Id.; see also Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that a court order protects the status quo to protect the integrity of the
arbitration process); Hughley v. Rocky Mountain Health Maint. Org., Inc., 927
P.2d 1325, 1333 (Colo. 1996) (upholding the issuance of a preliminary injunction
until arbitrator addressed the matter of chemotherapy); King County v. Boeing
Co., 570 P.2d 713, 718-19 (Wash. App. 1977) (denying declaratory judgment be-
cause rental dispute was a matter for the arbitrator to decide).
144. RUAA § 8(b)(1).  Section 8(b)(1) reads as follows:
The arbitrator may issue such orders for provisional remedies, including
interim awards, as the arbitrator finds necessary to protect the effective-
ness of the arbitration proceeding and to promote the fair and expedi-
tious resolution of the controversy, to the same extent and under the
same conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil ac-
tion . . . .”
Id.
145. Id. § 8(b)(2).  The 1996 English Arbitration Act sections 44(1), (3), (4),
and (6) is the source of the term “urgent.”  Id. § 8 cmt. 3.
JOHNSON & PETERSEN_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
2002] REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 365
contract, or compel a party to refrain from particular conduct or
produce material.146
Most jurisdictions allow courts to issue provisional remedies
pending the outcome of an ongoing arbitration.147  Among federal
courts of appeal, the Eighth Circuit is the only dissenter to this
view.  In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey,148
the court recognized the inherent overlap of authority when a court
considers irreparable harm and the likelihood of success on the
merits, issues that it concluded should be left to the authority of the
arbitrator.149  There is some indication that security should be pro-
vided in such circumstances.150
The RUAA’s adoption of section 8 is designed to increase the
efficiency of the arbitration process by placing more authority in
the hands of arbitrators to handle such pre-hearing matters,
thereby reducing the need or opportunity for parties to resort to
the courts.  In seeking to expand the ability of arbitrators in this
area, the Drafting Committee cited a line of precedent holding that
arbitrators have broad authority to order provisional remedies and
interim relief.151  Section 8 is intended to codify these developments
146. See Fraulo v. Gabelli, 657 A.2d 704, 711 (Conn. App. 1995) (concerning
the arbitrator’s preliminary order regarding proceeds of sale); Park City Assoc. v.
Total Energy Leasing Corp., 396 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (af-
firming denial of preliminary injunction as “the direction for arbitration encom-
passes the night of the arbitrator . . . to grant provisional remedies”).
147. See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 1281.8 (West Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:23A-6(b) (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(c) (McKinney 2002); Ban-
cAmerica Commercial Corp. v. Brown, 806 P.2d 897, 900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(issuing a writ of attachment to secure settlement agreement between creditor and
debtor); Lamber v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 32, 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (is-
suing mechanic’s lien); Hughley, 927 P.2d at 1333 (issuing preliminary injunction
to maintain chemotherapy treatment provided by health maintenance organiza-
tion); Salvucci v. Sheehan, 212 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Mass. 1965) (issuing a temporary
restraining order to prevent conveyance or encumbrance of property subject to a
pending arbitration).
148. 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that there is no judicial relief
because the “judicial inquiry requisite to determine the propriety of injunctive re-
lief necessarily would inject the court into the merits of issues more appropriately
left to the arbitrator”).
149. See 2 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 25.1 (1999).
150. See Anaconda v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 42, 46 (1944) (holding that
private parties may not agree to eliminate the use of traditional admiralty proce-
dures, or its concomitant security, from the requirements of the United States Ar-
bitration Act).
151. RUAA § 8 cmt. 4; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-6 (providing for
provisional remedies such as “attachment, replevin, sequestration and other corre-
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and give arbitrators a larger scope of authority so as to further limit
the occasions and need for judicial action.
6. Section 21—Remedies in Final Awards.  A key provision in
the RUAA relates to one of the most often litigated issues under
the original UAA—remedies.152  Section 21 expressly provides that
an arbitrator may award punitive damages,153 attorney’s fees and
sponding or equivalent remedies”); Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of
Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding arbitrator’s interim
award requiring city to continue performance of coal purchase contract until fur-
ther order of arbitration panel).
152. RUAA § 21(a)-(e) provides:
An arbitrator may award punitive damages or other exemplary relief
if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same
claim and the evidence produced at the hearing justifies the award under
the legal standards otherwise applicable to the claim.
An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney’s fees and other rea-
sonable expenses of arbitration if such an award is authorized by law in a
civil action involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to
the arbitration proceeding.
As to all remedies other than those authorized by subsections (a) and
(b), an arbitrator may order such remedies as the arbitrator considers
just and appropriate under the circumstances of the arbitration pro-
ceeding.  The fact that such a remedy could not or would not be granted
by the court is not a ground for refusing to confirm an award under Sec-
tion 22 or for vacating an award under Section 23.
An arbitrator’s expenses and fees, together with other expenses, must
be paid as provided in the award.
If an arbitrator awards punitive damages or other exemplary relief
under subsection (a), the arbitrator shall specify in the award the basis in
fact justifying and the basis in law authorizing the award and state sepa-
rately the amount of the punitive damages or other exemplary relief.
153. Although section 21 is a new feature, the concept of an arbitrator award-
ing punitive damages is not.  This follows the trend of the RUAA in accommo-
dating the growth in arbitration and arbitration common law developments.  See
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding
that the arbitral award, including punitive damages, should have been enforced
according to the scope of the contract between the parties); Baker v. Sadick, 208
Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a doctor who submitted a
tort claim to an arbitrator cannot claim arbitrator’s lack of authority over punitive
damages); Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (“A
valid and enforceable arbitration provision divests the court of jurisdiction over all
arbitrable issues.”); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v.  McFadden, 509 So. 2d
1212, 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that tort actions including punitive
damages are proper subjects for arbitration); Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp., 410
A.2d 630, 632 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (holding that under Maryland’s Health
Care Malpractice Claims Statute, arbitration panels have authority to award puni-
tive damages); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726, 731 (N.C. Ct.
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expenses,154 and any other remedy that an arbitrator deems just and
appropriate unless the parties provide otherwise in the arbitration
agreement.155  This follows the overall theme of the RUAA by em-
powering arbitrators while at the same time allowing parties to
sculpt their agreement as they see fit.  An arbitrator may have
broad authority to control the process of arbitration and issue
remedies that are just and appropriate, but parties are free to
eliminate certain types of remedies through limitation of remedies
clauses.
Section 21 does give rise to concerns regarding adhesion con-
tracts in the context of arbitration agreements between consumers
and lenders, employers and employees, and medical providers and
subscribers.  The Drafting Committee chose to leave the issue of
adhesion contracts and unconscionability to developing case law
across the country.156  The Drafting Committee noted that a large
number of organizations have developed “Due Process Protocols”
to ensure procedural and substantive fairness in employment, con-
sumer, and health care arbitrations.157
7. Section 18—Arbitrator Self-Enforcement.  Because arbitra-
tion awards are not self-enforcing, parties receiving an unfavorable
ruling in an arbitration proceeding may evade an order simply by
refusing to comply.  Parties receiving favorable rulings are, there-
fore, forced to seek a court order enforcing the arbitrator’s ruling.
Enforcement of final awards is usually not a problem because a
prevailing party only has to file a motion with the court for an or-
App. 1985) (holding that arbitrators may settle any controversy arising between
parties to an arbitration contract, including tort claims or claims for punitive dam-
ages); Kline v. O’Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
arbitrators may determine the sufficiency of pleadings to support awards for puni-
tive damages); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that arbitrator’s award of exemplary damages can-
not be modified where such claims have expressly been submitted in the arbitra-
tion agreement).  But see Leroy v. Waller, 731 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Ark. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that Arkansas law does not allow arbitration of tort claims, and
thus arbitration panels are without power to award punitive damages); Sch. City
of E. Chi., Ind. v. East Chi. Fed. of Teachers, 422 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that arbitrator’s award of punitive damages was void as against
public policy); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985) (holding
that “an arbitrator should not be given authority to award punitive damages”);
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (“An arbitrator has
no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties.”).
154. RUAA § 21(b).
155. Id. § 21(a)-(c).
156. See id. § 6 cmt. 7.
157. Id.
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der of confirmation.158  However, the enforcement of pre-award
rulings, such as provisional remedies, is much more problematic.
Courts are generally very hesitant to grant review of interlocutory
orders of an arbitrator except on issues involving privilege or con-
fidentiality.159
Section 18 of the RUAA rectifies this situation and greases the
wheels of arbitration by allowing a prevailing party to seek expe-
dited review of an arbitrator’s pre-award ruling pursuant to RUAA
section 22 (Confirmation of Award).  Section 18 also commands
that courts “shall summarily decide” such motions and issue an or-
der confirming the ruling unless the court vacates, modifies, or cor-
rects it.160  Section 18 allows for speedy determinations of pre-
hearing rulings.161  Note, however, that there is no provision in the
RUAA providing for an appeal from a court decision on a pre-
hearing ruling by an arbitrator.162
8.  Section 30–-Technology.  Section 30 of the RUAA incorpo-
rates the requirements of section 102 of the Electronic Signatures
in Global and National Commerce Act163 regarding the legal effect,
validity, and enforceability of electronic records or electronic signa-
tures.  The opportunity for online dispute resolution is becoming a
new avenue to resolve controversies quickly,164 and the RUAA at-
tempts to address what the UAA did not, in light of technological
advances.
B. Clarifying Provisions
1. Section 6—Arbitrability.  Section 6, the updated version of
the UAA section 1, addresses the validity of arbitration contracts.
It is not an entirely new section, but, among other things, it at-
tempts to provide additional guidance on the issue of who decides
158. Id. § 22; UAA § 11.
159. RUAA § 18 cmt. 1; see also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Am. Arbitration
Ass’n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that “judicial review prior to the
rendition of a final arbitration award should be indulged, if at all, only in the most
extreme cases”).
160. RUAA § 18.
161. Id. § 18 cmt. 2.
162. Id. § 18 cmt. 3.  The intent of section 18 is not to allow such orders from a
lower court to be appealed.  Id.
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001, 7002 (2000).
164. See generally William K. Slate, Online Dispute Resolution: Click Here to
Settle Your Dispute, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2001-Jan. 2002, at 8.
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arbitrability and by what criteria.165  In response to common law
developments in many states, section 6 provides that courts are to
decide substantive arbitrability questions, but leaves procedural
questions for the arbitrator to decide.166  Under this clarifying posi-
tion, arbitrators will have statutory authority to determine whether
all conditions precedent are fulfilled prior to the start of arbitra-
tion.167  For example, procedural areas include laches, notice, es-
toppel, and other conditions precedent.  However, statutes of limi-
tations may be an exception to the rule.168
While section 6 does not substantially change the UAA, it
does explicitly accommodate computer technology.169  A written
agreement or computer agreement is valid, enforceable, and ir-
revocable under the RUAA unless some basis in law or equity
makes it revocable.170  The RUAA’s broad definition of “record”
and its adoption of standards regarding the validity of electronic
records and signatures171 allow arbitration agreements and pro-
ceedings to take better advantage of new technology.
The issue of federal preemption of state arbitration laws is
particularly relevant to questions of arbitrability.  The U.S. Su-
165. See RUAA prefatory note.  This was a particular issue of concern identi-
fied by the Drafting Committee.
166. Compare RUAA § 6(b) (“The court shall decide whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.”) with
RUAA § 6(c) (“An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbi-
trability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to
arbitrate is enforceable.”).
167. Id. § 6(b).
168. Compare Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308,
1313 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that the court rather than the arbitrator should decide
whether a statute of limitations bars an arbitration) with 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Dar, 757
N.E.2d 515, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (upholding arbitrator’s determination that
agreement’s ten-day limitation was not enforceable).
169. Section 6(a) of the RUAA provides that “[a]n agreement contained in a
record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising be-
tween the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except
upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.”
RUAA § 6(a).  The reference to “in a record” is provided in the new definitions
section.  Id. § 1.  The original UAA does not have a definitions section.  The
RUAA defines “record” as “information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or
that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form.” Id. § 1(6).  In the comments of section 1, the Drafting Committee states
that the definition is intended to accommodate the use of electronic evidence in
commercial transactions.  Id. § 1(6) cmt. 5.
170. Id. § 6(a).
171. See supra Part III.A.8.
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preme Court has provided guideposts in the preemption area, sug-
gesting that any arbitration agreement should provide clear and
express language about what is being waived or altered. 172  For ex-
ample, waiver of arbitrability issues to be decided by a court must
be clearly stated in the contract along with clear guidance for de-
termining the arbitrability of a contract dispute.173
2. Section 15—Arbitration Procedures.  Section 15 of the
RUAA is intended to give broad authority to arbitrators to control
and manage all arbitration proceedings.174  If arbitration is to be
placed on equal footing with traditional litigation, an arbitrator
must be able to hold pre-hearing conferences and rule on prelimi-
nary matters in the same way a judge would conduct judicial pre-
trial conferences and preliminary motions.  Section 15 seeks to em-
power arbitrators in ways that the original UAA did not.
Section 15 provides that an arbitrator may conduct an arbitra-
tion in any manner that the arbitrator considers appropriate for a
fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding.175  An arbitrator
may rule on summary dispositions176 on the request of any party af-
172. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (ob-
serving that the relevant state law required an objective showing that the parties
intended to submit a controversy to arbitration); Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehmon Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (applying common law principle that
a party who drafts an ambiguous agreement may not later claim the benefit of the
doubt); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)
(implying that general state law contract principles govern the interpretation of
arbitration agreements).
173. See generally Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 287 (1999) (providing detailed discussion regarding the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s directions regarding arbitration, state arbitration, and contracting
parties’ authority to choose).
174. The corresponding UAA section is section 5.
175. See RUAA § 15(a).  Section 15(a) states that
[a]n arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the arbitra-
tor considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the
proceeding.  The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the
power to hold conferences with the parties to the arbitration proceeding
before the hearing and, among other matters, determine the admissibil-
ity, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
Id.
176. Summary disposition is not equated with summary judgment.  Questions
of law and summary judgment motions are some, but not all, of the matters for an
arbitrator to rule on.  An arbitrator is not confined to the rules of evidence and is
free to consider whatever he or she believes to be relevant to an award.  See id. §
15 cmt. 3.
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ter notice and opportunity to respond have been provided.177  The
UAA did not provide such authority to arbitrators, but the Draft-
ing Committee noted that “arbitrators probably have the inherent
authority to perform such tasks.”178  Section 15, however, explicitly
places more procedural matters within the discretion of arbitrators
under the RUAA.
3. Section 17—Discovery.  The RUAA also expands an arbi-
trator’s authority to issue protective orders179 and establishes the
arbitrator’s authority to issue discovery-related orders.180  Under
the UAA, an arbitrator’s authority included subpoena and deposi-
tion powers.181  The RUAA expands on this authority and provides
for arbitrator discretion concerning discovery.182  However, this
grant may conflict with the goals of arbitration, as expansive dis-
covery only weighs down the process and undermines the primary
benefits associated with arbitration—efficiency and cost effective-
ness.
4. Section 14—Arbitrator Immunity.  Another addition to the
RUAA is section 14, providing that arbitrators and arbitration or-
177. Id. § 15(b)(1)-(2).  Section 15(b) reads as follows:
[a]n arbitrator may decide a request for summary disposition of a claim or
particular issue: (1) if all interested parties agree; or (2) upon request of
one party to the arbitration proceeding if that party gives notice to all
other parties . . . and the other parties have a reasonable opportunity to
respond.
Id.
178. Id. § 15 cmt. 2.
179. Id. § 17(e) (“An arbitrator may issue a protective order to prevent the dis-
closure of privileged information, confidential information, trade secrets, and
other information protected from disclosure to the extent a court could if the con-
troversy were the subject of a civil action . . . .”).
180. Id. § 17(c) (“An arbitrator may permit such discovery as the arbitrator de-
cides is appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the par-
ties to the arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability
of making the proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective.”).
181. UAA § 17.  Under the RUAA the subpoena and deposition authority is
not subject to party waiver.  See RUAA § 4(b)(1).  However, there is no restric-
tion on whether parties can alter or vary the protective order or other discovery-
related authority.  A party’s ability to waive pre-hearing discovery should encour-
age parties to negotiate their own methods of discovery.  Id. § 17 cmt. 3.
182. See RUAA § 17 cmt. 3 (“[D]iscretion rests with the arbitrators whether to
allow discovery.  The discovery procedure in Section 17(c) is intended to aid the
arbitration process and ensure an expeditious, efficient and informed arbitration,
while adequately protecting the rights of the parties.”).
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ganizations acting in that capacity are immune from civil liability.183
Arbitral immunity is the rule in virtually every jurisdiction,184
shielding arbitrators from having to testify185 in any type of pro-
ceeding.186  Unless criminal activity waives the immunity187 or a
complaining party desires to have an arbitrator testify in order to
show alleged fraud,188 arbitrators possess immunity similar to that
of judicial officers.  Immunity questions commonly arise when a
party attempts to summon an arbitrator to testify about his rea-
soning supporting an award or any suspected conflicts of interest.
Section 14(d)(2) recognizes that arbitrators who have engaged
in corruption, fraud, partiality, or other misconduct may be re-
quired to give testimony so that a party will have evidence to prove
such grounds to vacate an award under sections 23(a)(1) and (2).189
However, “[s]uch testimony or records from an arbitrator are only
required after the objecting party makes a sufficient initial showing
that such grounds exist.”190  Without such objective evidence, arbi-
trators should not have to testify or produce records from the arbi-
tration proceeding.191
Extending quasi-judicial immunity when arbitrators function
similarly to judges is a codification of common law.192  This section
183. Id. § 14(a).
184. Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1267 (Alaska 1995).
185. RUAA § 14(d).  Section 14(d) reads as follows:
In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or repre-
sentative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and
may not be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct,
decision, or ruling occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the
same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity.
Id.; see also Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 430 (9th Cir. 1996) (de-
nying request to depose arbitrator); Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891, 899 (2d
Cir. 1991) (denying request to depose arbitrator where there was no clear evi-
dence of bias or impropriety).
186. RUAA § 14(a) (“An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in
that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court
of this State acting in a judicial capacity.”).
187. Id. § 14 cmt. 8 (“Section 14 does not grant arbitrators or arbitration or-
ganizations immunity from criminal liability arising from their conduct in their ar-
bitral or administrative roles.”).
188. Id. § 14 cmt. 5.
189. Id. § 14(d)(2).
190. Id. § 14 cmt. 5.
191. Id.
192. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978) (extending judicial-like
immunity when “functional comparability” of non-judicial officials’ acts and
judgments resembles that of judicial official); Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d
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is new, but not surprising in light of the fact that the RUAA seeks
to empower arbitrators and raise the process of arbitration to near
equal status with traditional litigation. 193  The immunity also applies
to arbitration organizations and organization representatives so
long as each is acting with judge-like responsibilities.194  There is no
waiver of immunity when an arbitrator fails to disclose known, di-
rect, and material interests or known, existing, and substantial rela-
tionships.195  The sole remedy for this situation is vacatur.196  As a
deterrent to challenging arbitrators’ immunity, the RUAA makes it
permissible to collect attorney’s fees and expenses associated with
the successful defense of lawsuits.197
5. Sections 22, 23, 24, and 25—Judicial Review.  Since arbitra-
tion has always been a resolution process that narrows judicial at-
tention, the RUAA includes few substantive changes from the
original UAA provisions regarding confirmation,198 vacatur,199
1266, 1267 (Alaska 1995) (“Arbitral immunity gives arbitrators absolute immunity
from liability for damages arising out of quasi-judicial actions taken by them.”).
193. See, e.g., Southwire Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 545 S.E.2d 681, 684-85
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Higdon v. Constr. Arbitration Assocs., Ltd., 71 S.W.3d 131,
132 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002); Kabia v. Koch, 713 N.Y.2d 250, 256-57 (Civ. Ct. 2000);
Buyer’s First Realty, Inc. v. Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors, 745 N.E.2d 1069,
1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
194. RUAA § 14(a); see Olson v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 85 F.3d 381,
383 (8th Cir. 1996); Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d
Cir. 1990); see also New England Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n,
199 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999); Honn v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 182
F.3d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1999); Hawkins v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 149
F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1998); Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th
Cir. 1982).
195. RUAA § 14(c); see also id. § 12.
196. Id. § 23.
197. Id. § 14(e).  Section 14(e) reads as follows:
If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration or-
ganization, or representative of an arbitration organization arising from
the services of the arbitrator, organization, or representative or if a per-
son seeks to compel an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration
organization to testify or produce records . . . and the court decides that
the arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitra-
tion organization is immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or
representative of the organization is not competent to testify, the court
shall award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative reasonable
attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation.
Id.
198. See RUAA § 22.  This section is not waivable per section 4 of the RUAA.
Compare UAA § 11.
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modification, or correction200 of awards.  The Drafting Committee
was aware that in order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness
of arbitration it was important to refrain from adding new grounds
for courts to review the merits of arbitration awards.
During the revision process, the most controversial area of
discussion was the proposed addition of more grounds on which
courts could vacate arbitration awards.  Ultimately, “manifest dis-
regard of the law” and “violation of public policy” were not in-
cluded in section 23 (Vacating Award) as permissible bases on
which a court could vacate an arbitration award.201  Nor does the
RUAA provide for expanded judicial review of an arbitrator’s de-
cision for errors of law or fact.  The Drafting Committee believed
that several policy risks weighed against such a substantive change.
Notably, the Drafting Committee believed that allowing parties a
“second bite at the apple” would effectively undermine the finality
of arbitration and increase costs, both in terms of time and re-
sources.202
The only new ground for vacatur in section 23 relates to situa-
tions in which arbitration is conducted notwithstanding improper
notice under section 9.203  A party seeking to challenge an award on
this basis must make a timely objection and show that the lack of
proper notice substantially prejudiced its rights.204  It is also worth
noting that the RUAA allows for a shorter time period than the
FAA in which a prevailing party can file a motion requesting judi-
cial confirmation of an award.205  Although it declines to provide
new grounds for judicial review, the RUAA imposes few restric-
tions on the ability of parties to add appropriate grounds for judi-
cial review when drafting their arbitration agreements.  Section 4 of
199. See RUAA § 23.  This section is not waivable per section 4 of the RUAA.
Compare UAA § 12.
200. See RUAA § 24.  This section is not waivable per section 4 of the RUAA.
Compare UAA § 13.
201. RUAA § 23 cmt. C(1).
202. Id. § 23 cmt. B(1).
203. Id. § 23(a)(6).
204. Id. §§ 23(a)(6), 23(b).
205. Id. § 22 cmt. 2.  This comment states that
[t]he Drafting Commmittee considered but rejected the language in
FAA Section 9 that limits a motion to confirm an award to a one-year
period of time.  The consensus of the Drafting Committee was that the
general statute of limitations in a State for the filing and execution on a
judgment should apply.
Id.
JOHNSON & PETERSEN_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
2002] REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 375
the RUAA merely prohibits attempts to eliminate all judicial re-
view.206
Section 25 allows the court discretion to award attorney’s fees
and expenses for contested judicial proceedings to confirm, vacate,
modify, or correct an award.207  This provision is waivable under
section 4.  If the parties wish for a different rule, they remain free
to contract as they please.208  Section 25 also updates the word
choice of UAA section 15 regarding judgment rolls and docketing
so that arbitration awards can be “recorded, docketed, and en-
forced as any other judgment in a civil action.”209
IV.  ALASKA’S ARBITRATION LAW AND THE RUAA
In fifteen states, legislation adopting the RUAA was intro-
duced during the 2001-02 legislative session; one state, Utah, has
officially enacted the RUAA.210  This part of the Article will ex-
amine whether the RUAA would create harmony or discord with
Alaska arbitration law and whether the Alaska legislature should
consider adopting the RUAA.
A. Review of Alaska Law
Unlike many jurisdictions, Alaska case law on arbitration in
general, and on the UAA in particular, is fairly limited.  Cases un-
der the UAA have generally focused on issues such as who deter-
206. Id. § 4.
207. Id. § 25.
208. Id. § 25 cmt. 6.
209. Id. § 25 cmt. 2.
210. The jurisdictions introducing such legislation, as of August 2002, are Ari-
zona, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah (enacted), Vermont, Virginia, and
West Virginia.  See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, http://www.nccusl.org (last modified Aug. 16, 2002).  The RUAA is also
gaining support from numerous groups, including an endorsement from the
ABA’s House of Delegates in San Diego, California (Feb. 14-20, 2001).  The
RUAA has also been endorsed by seven separate sections of the ABA: Dispute
Resolution; Litigation; Business Law; Labor and Employment Law; Torts and In-
surance Practice; Real Property, Probate and Trust Law; and Senior Lawyers.
Press Release, Revised Uniform Act Receiving Widespread Support, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Feb. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/pr2-22-01-1.asp.  The RUAA has also
been endorsed by the American Arbitration Association, the National Arbitration
Forum, the National Academy of Arbitrators, Jams, the Dispute Resolution
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and the Ameri-
can College of Real Estate Lawyers.  Id.
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mines arbitrability, the level of review that courts should apply to
an arbitrator’s decision and award, the availability of particular
remedies, and the role of the arbitrator in weighing evidence.
Consistent with other jurisdictions, the Alaska Supreme Court
has routinely asserted that Alaska’s arbitration statute (a version of
the UAA) “evinces a strong public policy in favor of arbitration.”211
Given that arbitration should be an alternative to litigation, not a
prelude to it, the court “ha[s] followed a policy of minimal court in-
terference with arbitration.”212  The court has also routinely
stressed that such a policy permits parties, “in the absence of re-
stricting statutory terms,” to contract freely “for the terms of arbi-
tration that they desire.”213
1. Arbitrability.  While courts have been mixed on the issue
of whether arbitrators or courts determine the arbitrability of a
dispute,214 the Alaska Supreme Court has fallen on the side of the
debate that honors the parties’ intent.  In State v. Public Safety
Employees Ass’n,215 the court stressed that arbitration was “a crea-
ture of contract law,” allowing the parties to contract freely for
those terms deemed important for an arbitration agreement.216  The
court adopted the federal rule, which provides that “arbitrability is
a question for the courts ‘[u]nless the parties clearly and unmis-
takably provide otherwise.’”217  The court concluded that the arbi-
trator should decide which issues are arbitrable since the parties
had “unmistakably agreed to submit the question” to the arbitra-
tor.218
2. Procedural Issues.  Several procedural issues have arisen in
judicial review of arbitrator decisions.  Chief among them are con-
solidation and intervention, although some other minor issues have
also been discussed.219  In Consolidated Pacific Engineering v.
Greater Anchorage Borough,220 the Alaska Supreme Court exam-
ined whether the superior court could order the consolidation of
two arbitration proceedings over the objection of a party.221  The
court noted that nothing in Alaska’s court rules or statutes, even
Alaska’s arbitration statute, either permitted or prohibited con-
211. Modern Const., Inc. v. Barce, Inc., 556 P.2d 528, 529 (Alaska 1976); Univ.
of Alaska v. Modern Const., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Alaska 1974).
212. City of Fairbanks Mun. Utils. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d 457, 459-60 (Alaska
1985) (citing Nizinski v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 509 P.2d 280, 283 (Alaska
1973)).
213. Bd. of Educ., Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Ewig, 609 P.2d
10, 12 (Alaska 1980) (citing Anchorage Med. & Surgical Clinic v. James, 555 P.2d
1320, 1321 (Alaska 1976)).
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solidation of arbitration proceedings.222  The court then observed a
split in authority among other jurisdictions and the American Arbi-
tration Association’s longstanding policy not to approve consolida-
tion without the consent of all parties.223  Emphasizing the rights of
the parties to determine the terms of arbitration through contract,
the court concluded that consolidation could not be ordered absent
language in the arbitration agreement supporting it.224  The court
214. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 1, at 355-57.  For a broadened and more
philosophical examination of the arbitrability question, see Rau, supra note 173.
215. 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).
216. Id. at 1285.
217. Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,
649 (1986)).
218. Id.
219. For example, in Marathon Oil Co. v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 972 P.2d 595
(Alaska 1999), the Alaska Supreme Court observed that in bifurcated proceed-
ings, a partial decision as to one portion of the case (liability, for example) cannot
be revised by the arbitrators once it has been issued.  Id. at 602 (citing Trade &
Transp. v. Natural Petro. Charterers, 931 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1991)).  The court
added that other courts have held that even when “the parties have not explicitly
agreed to the finality of a liability decision, the decision should be considered final
if the record suggests that the parties” believed it was final.  Id. (citing McGregor
Van De Moere, Inc. v. Paychex, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 616, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)).
Then in Int’l Bhd. of Electric Workers, Local Union 1547 v. City of Ketchi-
kan, 805 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1991), the court held that the superior court erred in
interpreting an award found to be ambiguous.  Id. at 341.  The court noted that
when asked to clarify an ambiguous award, the superior court should follow two
steps.  Id.  First, it should determine “whether the award is, in fact, ambiguous.”
Id.  Then, in cases where ambiguity does exist, the only option for the superior
court is to remand to the arbitrator for clarification.  Id.  The court stressed that a
superior court may not interpret an arbitrator’s award.  Id. at 343.  In that same
case, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that “[t]here is nothing in Alaska’s declara-
tory judgment act which prohibits its use to determine questions arising out of ar-
bitration.”  Id. at 342.
Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court has noted that a party will waive any
challenge to an arbitrator’s actions by failing to object during the arbitration pro-
ceedings.  See, e.g., Integrated Res. Equity Corp. v. Fairbanks North Star Bor-
ough, 799 P.2d 295, 298-99 (Alaska 1990); Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas,
Inc., 586 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Alaska 1978).
220. 563 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1977).
221. Id. at 252.
222. Id. at 254.
223. Id. at 254-55.
224. Id. at 255.
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also stressed that this approach reflected how the “law now favors
arbitration with a minimum of court interference.”225
The Alaska Supreme Court has provided even less guidance
on the issue of intervention.  The fundamental rule is that the lan-
guage of the arbitration agreement governs.226  In Powers v. United
Services Automobile Ass’n,227 the court examined whether an in-
jured motorist who pursued a successful arbitration against a pri-
mary carrier could preclude a secondary carrier from additional ar-
bitration where the secondary carrier had neither notice nor
opportunity to participate in the first arbitration.228  The court af-
firmed the superior court’s holding that collateral estoppel did not
preclude the secondary carrier from pursuing additional arbitra-
tion, primarily because there was no privity between the secondary
carrier and the parties to the arbitration agreement.229  The court
also rejected as meritless the contention that the secondary carrier
waived its right to arbitrate by “fail[ing] to participate in the sub-
ject arbitration.”230  The court found there was not “direct, une-
quivocal conduct” that indicated the secondary carrier had aban-
doned its right to arbitrate.231  Finally, the court noted it was
unclear whether intervention was even an option in arbitration,232
since the Alaska version of the UAA provided no guidance on in-
tervention.233
3. Judicial Review.  Generally speaking, actions to vacate an
award are governed by Alaska’s arbitration statute.234  Such appli-
225. Id. (quoting Nikiski v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 509 P.2d 280, 283
(Alaska 1973)).
226. See, e.g., Bd. of Education, Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist. v.
Ewig, 609 P.2d 10, 13 (Alaska 1980) (“The arbitrator will be without power or
authority to make any decisions . . . which [are] violative of the terms of this
Agreement.”).
227. 6 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2000).
228. Id. at 295.
229. Id. at 297.
230. Id. at 298.
231. Id. at 299 (quoting Airoulofski v. State, 922 P.2d 889, 894 (Alaska 1988)).
232. Id.
233. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-09.43.180 (Michie 2001).
234. See id. § 09.43.120(a).  Section 09.43.120(a) reads as follows:
On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award if
(1) the award was procured by fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neu-
tral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the
rights of a party;
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
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cations before the superior court should be conducted in the same
manner as provided for in the hearing of motions.235  The arbitra-
tion award is to be presumed valid.236  At a hearing, the party chal-
lenging the award bears the burden of proof.237
The proper standard of review for an arbitration award de-
pends on the basis for the arbitration.238  The Alaska Supreme
Court has identified at least five different standards of review ap-
plicable to arbitrators’ decisions and awards of remedies: (1) purely
unreviewable;239 (2) the “reasonably possible” standard;240 (3) the
“gross error” standard;241 (4) the “arbitrary and capricious” stan-
dard;242 and (5) a due process standard.243  The level of review or the
scrutiny applied to the arbitrator’s decision increases as the parties
lose their autonomy over the terms of the arbitration process.  A
brief summary of these standards will be useful in determining if
certain provisions of the RUAA comport with Alaska law.
For arbitrations conducted under the UAA, “the standard of
review is highly deferential.”244  In Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Construc-
tors, Inc.,245 the court noted that in arbitrations conducted under
Alaska’s Uniform Arbitration Act, an arbitrator’s findings of fact
are unreviewable even in the face of gross error.246  Similarly, the
(4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown for postponement or refused to hear evidence mate-
rial to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to
the provisions of AS 09.43.050, as to prejudice substantially the rights of
a party; or
(5) there was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not ad-
versely determined in proceedings under AS 09.43.020 and the party did
not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.
Id.
235. City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d 457, 460-61 (Alaska
1985) (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.150; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 77).
236. Lees, 705 P.2d at 461; Univ. of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d
1132, 1139 (Alaska 1974).
237. Lees, 705 P.2d at 461.
238. Butler v. Dunlap, 931 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam).
239. See, e.g., Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d 657, 660-61
(Alaska 1995).
240. See, e.g., Modern Constr., 522 P.2d at 1137.
241. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 628 P.2d 565, 567 (Alaska 1981).
242. See Butler, 931 P.2d at 1039.
243. See A. Fred Miller, PC v. Purvis, 921 P.2d 610, 618 (Alaska 1996).
244. Butler, 931 P.2d at 1038.
245. 894 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1995).
246. Id. at 660-61; see also Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas, Inc., 586
P.2d 1244, 1247-48 (Alaska 1978).  The court has also applied this “statutory stan-
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court has asserted several times that there is no judicial review of
the merits of an arbitrator’s decision.247  The Ahtna court noted that
an arbitrator’s conclusions of law, including conclusions concerning
the meaning of the parties’ contract, are not reviewable except with
respect to questions concerning arbitrability.248  The court favorably
quoted the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale: “It is the arbitrator’s
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract
is different from his.”249  The court took great pains to emphasize
that the Riley Pleas standard, prohibiting judicial review of an arbi-
trator’s construction of the contract as to issues other than arbitra-
bility, was the proper standard for courts to apply.250
When arbitrability is the issue, the standard of review con-
cerning questions of law is whether the arbitrator’s conclusion is
reasonably possible.251  Under this standard, an arbitrator’s con-
struction of the contract, not the underlying factual findings, will be
reviewed to determine whether it “is a reasonably possible [con-
struction] that can seriously be made in the context in which the
contract was made.”252  Applying this standard, the court in Breeze
v. Sims253 concluded that it was within the arbitrator’s powers as a
trier of fact to determine that an oral contract existed between the
parties and obligated former clients to pay their attorney’s fees and
entitled clients to demand fee arbitration pursuant to Alaska Bar
Rule 34.254  Additionally, in Marathon Oil Co. v. ARCO Alaska,
Inc.,255 the court held that the arbitrators’ interpretation of an
agreement was reasonable when they found that the current field
operator (Marathon Oil) was responsible for gas re-delivery, even
dard of review” to findings of fact issued by an arbitrator pursuant to Alaska Bar
Rule 34 (fee arbitration).  Breeze v. Sims, 778 P.2d 215, 217 (Alaska 1989).
247. See, e.g., Masden v. Univ. of Alaska, 633 P.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Alaska 1981);
Riley Pleas, 586 P.2d at 1247.
248. Ahtna, 894 P.2d at 661.
249. Id. (quoting United Steel Workers of Amer. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)).
250. Id. at 661-62.
251. Univ. of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Alaska
1974).
252. Id. (quoting Maynard E. Pirsig, Some Comments on Arbitration Legisla-
tion and the Uniform Act, 10 VAND. L. REV. 685, 706 (1957)).
253. 778 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1989).
254. Id. at 217-18 (citing Curran v. Hastreiter, 579 P.2d 524, 526 (Alaska 1978);
see also Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas, Inc., 586 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Alaska
1978)).
255. 972 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1999).
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though this conclusion required the arbitrators to revise the final
liability decision.256
In disputes where the arbitration agreement expressly ex-
cludes the arbitration from Alaska’s arbitration statute,257 the
Alaska Supreme Court has used a standard of “gross error” in re-
viewing an arbitrator’s decisions of law and fact.258  “Gross error” is
defined as “only those mistakes which are both obvious and signifi-
cant.”259
The “most searching” standard of review applied by the
Alaska Supreme Court applies to cases of compulsory arbitra-
tion.260  Under this standard, the court must overturn the arbitra-
tor’s finding if it concludes that the determination was “arbitrary
and capricious.”261  This standard of review has been impliedly
equated with the “abuse of discretion” standard.262  The Alaska Su-
preme Court, in explaining why a heightened standard of review
was necessary for mandatory arbitration, has provided the follow-
ing:
When parties agree to submit their differences to an arbitrator,
they should be bound by his decision.  Courts should be reluc-
tant to upset arbitrators’ awards, lest the advantages of arbitra-
tion as a fast and certain means of resolving disputes be lost.
Occasional uncorrected errors in arbitrators’ decisions are toler-
able because the parties have agreed to accept reduced possibili-
ties of appellate review in order to have their dispute resolved
256. See id. at 601-02.  The court specifically rejected an argument by Marathon
Oil that the arbitrators were not empowered to interpret the agreement, noting,
“[a]bsent the ability to construe arbitration agreements, arbitrators would be pre-
cluded from acting during hearings because the agreements are the source of their
powers.”  Id. at 601.
257. ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (Michie 2000) provides:
A written agreement to submit an existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration a subsequent con-
troversy between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, ex-
cept upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a
contract. However, AS 09.43.010–9.43.180 do not apply to a labor-
management contract unless they are incorporated into the contract by
reference or their application is provided for by statute.
258. See City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 628 P.2d 565, 567 (Alaska 1981); Nizinski v.
Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 509 P.2d 280, 283 (Alaska 1973); see also City of
Valdez v. 18.99 Acres, 686 P.2d 682, 687-88 n.9 (Alaska 1984).
259. Rice, 628 P.2d at 567.
260. Butler v. Dunlap, 931 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Alaska 1997).
261. Id.; see also Public Safety Employees Ass’n, Local 92 v. State, 895 P.2d
980, 984 (Alaska 1995); Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Dept.
Employees Ass’n, 839 P.2d 1080, 1088 (Alaska 1992).
262. Butler, 931 P.2d at 1039.
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quickly and with certainty.  Compulsory arbitration is different.
The parties have not agreed voluntarily to accept reduced possi-
bilities of appellate review in order to resolve their dispute
swiftly.  It is by operation of law that the parties are denied their
usual right to have their disputes resolved by the courts.  There-
fore, a standard of review higher than gross error is appropri-
ate.263
The court has also applied this standard in situations where a party
seeks to support a claim that an arbitrator’s decision should be va-
cated for refusing to grant a request for postponement.264
A final standard of review applicable only to attorney fee arbi-
tration is one that examines whether due process was accorded in
the arbitration proceeding.  In A. Fred Miller, P.C. v. Purvis,265 an
attorney filed a petition to vacate an arbitrator’s award, arguing
that he was denied due process because judicial review on the mer-
its of the arbitrator’s decision was not available.266  Under the fee
arbitration rules, a client that has a fee dispute with an attorney has
a right to have the dispute resolved by arbitration.267  The court
noted that the rules include several fairly specific procedural provi-
sions for the arbitration of fee disputes, including notice and hear-
ing requirements, the opportunity to challenge the panel peremp-
torily, the ability to compel witnesses, procedures for taking
telephonic evidence, and a requirement for the arbitrator to pro-
vide a written decision.268  Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge269
standards to these rules, the court concluded that the rules satisfied
the minimal requirements of having an opportunity to be heard
and the right to represent one’s interests.270  The court balanced the
interest in appellate review with the undesirability of the extra de-
lay and expense associated with extended review, concluding that
“the benefits to be gained from appellate review on the merits nec-
essarily outweigh the detriments which such review would en-
tail.”271
263. State v. Public Safety Employees Ass’n, 798 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Alaska
1990).
264. See Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 932 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Alaska
1997) (“[A] litigant should be required to show that the arbitrator committed
gross error in his determination that a litigant did not show ‘sufficient cause’ for
postponement.”).
265. 921 P.2d 610 (Alaska 1996).
266. Id. at 611-12.
267. See ALASKA BAR R. 34(b).
268. See A. Fred Miller, 921 P.2d at 612.
269. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
270. A. Fred Miller, 921 P.2d at 617-18.
271. Id. at 618.
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4. Remedies.  The Alaska Supreme Court has examined two
general areas of remedies—pre- and post-judgment interest and at-
torney’s fees.  Primarily, the court has approached the issue as one
of contractual intent.  For example, in Board of Education, Fair-
banks North Star Borough v. Ewig,272 the court upheld an award of
a teacher’s back pay because a disagreement over salary might in-
clude such an award, and it did not violate the arbitration agree-
ment.273  Additionally, in Alaska Public Employees Ass’n v. State,
Department of Environmental Conservation,274 the court empha-
sized an arbitrator’s broad discretion in fashioning a remedy,
holding that under the applicable agreement this power permitted
the arbitrator to define a worker’s former job by function rather
than merely by its title.275
Regarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, the
Alaska Supreme Court has held that it is the duty of the arbitrator
to award pre-judgment interest, while the superior court may order
post-judgment interest.  In Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna,
Inc.,276 the court noted that Alaska was different from many other
jurisdictions in that it awarded pre-judgment interest largely “as a
matter of course.”277  In Ebasco Constructors, the superior court
had awarded both pre- and post-judgment interest.278  Reversing
the superior court as to the pre-judgment interest, the supreme
court noted that “permitting a reviewing court to add pre-award in-
terest to an arbitration award would be inconsistent with the policy
of allowing the arbitrator to determine all arbitrable aspects of a
dispute.”279  The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior
court, however, as to the post-judgment interest, noting that com-
putation of such awards will always be fairly straightforward, and
that an arbitrator, at the time of an arbitration award, is less capa-
272. 609 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1980).
273. Id. at 14.
274. 929 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1996).
275. Id. at 666 (“We have stated: ‘there is ample authority for the proposition
that arbirators generally have authority to fashion any remedy necessary to resolu-
tion of the dispute.’” (citation omitted)).
276. 932 P.2d 1312 (Alaska 1997).
277. Id. at 1317 (quoting Hofmann v. von Wirth, 907 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska
1995) (quoting Tookalook Sales & Serv. v. McGahan, 846 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska
1993))).
278. Ebasco Constructors, 932 P.2d at 1314.
279. Id. at 1317-18.
JOHNSON & PETERSEN_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
384 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:2
ble of determining the total amount of post-judgment interest to be
awarded.280
Under Alaska’s version of the UAA, the superior court is
authorized to award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing
party in an action to affirm or modify an arbitration award.281  The
Alaska Supreme Court has not permitted attorney’s fees absent di-
rect reference to arbitrating under the UAA or other specific lan-
guage in the arbitration agreement permitting such an award.  It
has limited this application to attorney’s fees associated with the
superior court action to vacate or confirm the arbitration award.
For example, in Marathon Oil Co. v. ARCO Alaska, Inc.,282 the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to
uphold an arbitration award and its ruling that the arbitration
agreement permitted recovery of attorney’s fees in an action to va-
cate or correct the award.283  However, in Harold’s Trucking v. Kel-
sey,284 the court noted that attorney’s fees are not typically available
in the arbitration proceeding itself.285  Similarly, the court has held
that the superior court’s calculation of Rule 82 fees (attorney’s
fees) based on the damages awarded at arbitration was clearly er-
roneous.286
280. Id. at 1318.  The court also affirmed the award of post-judgment interest as
applied to the arbitrator’s award of attorney’s fees.  The court observed:
For purposes of determining whether post-award interest is permissible,
there is no persuasive reason to treat attorney’s fees differently than
other parts of an arbitrator’s award.  An award of interest simply “places
an injured plaintiff in the same position as if he had been compensated
immediately for his loss.”
Id. (quoting City & Borough of Juneau v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d
957 (Alaska 1979)).
281. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.140 (Michie 1968); Anchorage Med. & Surgical
Clinic v. James, 555 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1976) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. §
09.43.140).
282. 972 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1999).
283. Id. at 604.
284. 584 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1978).
285. Id. at 1130; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.100 (Michie 2001) (“Unless
otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators’ expenses and
fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the con-
duct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award.” (emphasis
added)).
286. See Integrated Res. Equity Corp. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 799
P.2d 295, 300 (Alaska 1990).  The court noted that the language in Civil Rule 82
referring to the “costs of the action” applied only to the action in the superior
court to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an arbitrator’s award.  The court va-
cated the award of attorney’s fees, stressing that the prevailing party was entitled
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5. Evidentiary Issues.  The Alaska Supreme Court, consistent
with other jurisdictions, has held that strict evidentiary rules do not
apply to arbitration proceedings.287  However, despite this relaxed
approach, the court has also held that the principles of due process
require that parties have a right to a fair hearing and the opportu-
nity to cross-examine witnesses.288  The court has been reluctant to
reverse an arbitrator’s decision when an arbitrator has excluded
one specific form of evidence, but has admitted other forms; this is
particularly so where the arbitrator’s exclusion of evidence was di-
rectly related to determining the credibility of witnesses.289  The
court has also noted that the arbitrator is permitted to exclude evi-
dence as cumulative.290
B. Comparing Key RUAA Provisions to Alaska’s Common Law
While the Alaska Supreme Court has not had the occasion to
address many of the issues raised in the new or clarifying provisions
of the RUAA, the issues the court has addressed have been re-
solved consistent with the majority view.  The RUAA codification
of the approach adopted in the majority of jurisdictions on many
points is consistent with Alaska common law.  Many other provi-
sions, while not decided by Alaska courts, are most likely consis-
tent with the position the Alaska Supreme Court would take.
1. Arbitrability.  Section 6 of the RUAA provides that, unless
the parties otherwise agree, courts determine the substantive issues
of arbitrability, while arbitrators decide the procedural aspects,
such as time limits, laches, notice and other similar matters.  Under
prior Alaska case law, the court had followed the federal rule,
which provides that arbitrability is a question for the courts unless
the parties clearly provide otherwise.291  The RUAA preserves this
approach by providing that the parties may provide in their arbitra-
to reasonable attorney’s fees only for the confirmation hearing, and remanded the
case to the superior court.  Id.
287. See, e.g., Racine v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 663 P.2d 555,
557 (Alaska 1983) (holding that the plaintiff’s due process rights were not in-
fringed).
288. See id.
289. See City of Fairbanks Mun. Utils. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d 457, 461-62
(Alaska 1985).
290. See id. at 462 (citing Atlas Floor Covering v. Crescent House & Garden,
Inc., 333 P.2d 194, 198-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)).
291. State v. Pub. Safety Empls. Ass’n, 798 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska 1990) (cit-
ing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
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tion agreement whether the courts or arbitrators will determine
matters of substantive or procedural arbitrability.292
2. Procedural Issues.  Under RUAA section 10, courts have
the ability to order the consolidation of arbitration proceedings
under appropriate circumstances.293  The original UAA, and most
state statutes, do not contain a provision regarding consolidation.
RUAA section 10 contradicts federal case law under the FAA294
and the case law of several state jurisdictions295 by holding that al-
lowing courts to order consolidation conflicts with the concept of
party autonomy (assuming that consolidation is not provided for in
the arbitration agreement).  However, empirical evidence has
shown that parties to a multi-party arbitration dispute prefer that
courts have the power to provide for consolidation.296
On the surface, permitting consolidation might seem to con-
flict with Alaska law as well.  In Consolidated Pacific Engineering,
Inc. v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough,297 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that parties could not be ordered to consolidate absent
supporting language in the arbitration agreement.298  However, it is
overly simplistic to conclude that section 10 of the RUAA conflicts
with the court’s holding in Consolidated Pacific.  First, the court
noted that the UAA was silent as to consolidation.299  Second, the
court stressed the importance of minimal court interference.300  Un-
der the RUAA, however, consolidation is provided for explicitly,
thus avoiding a situation where a court would have to analogize to
the civil rules for guidance.  Third, section 10 is a default provision;
hence, the RUAA permits the parties to determine in their arbitra-
tion agreements whether to provide for consolidation and preserve
292. RUAA § 4(a).
293. Id. § 10.
294. See, e.g., Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prod. Co., 189 F.3d 264, 267-68
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding consolidation under FAA inappropriate absent specific
language permitting consolidation in the arbitration agreement).
295. See, e.g., Stop & Shop Cos. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 304 N.E.2d 429, 431-32
(Mass. 1973); J. Brodie & Son, Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 167 N.W.2d 886, 888
(Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 607
P.2d 856, 857 (Wash. 1980).
296. See Heinsz, supra note 26, at 13 (discussing results of two surveys showing
that 83% of practitioners and arbitrators polled preferred judicial determinations
on consolidation).
297. 563 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1977).
298. Id. at 255.
299. Id. at 254.
300. Id. at 255.
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party autonomy.301  Lastly, section 10(a)(4) requires courts deter-
mining whether to grant consolidation to consider any prejudice re-
sulting from “undue delay” or “hardship.”  This would provide ad-
ditional protection against the concerns expressed by the court in
Consolidated Pacific.302
3. Judicial Review.  The scope of a court’s authority is one of
the few areas left relatively unchanged in the new RUAA.  Most
relevant to Alaska jurisprudence was a decision by the Drafting
Committee not to provide a section allowing parties to “opt-in” to
judicial review of arbitration awards for errors of law.303  Particu-
larly, the Drafting Committee decided against allowing parties to
seek judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision when the law was in-
correctly applied.304
The decision by the Drafting Committee not to adopt this pro-
vision keeps the RUAA in line with the Alaska Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding judicial review.  As previously noted, the
Alaska Supreme Court’s overall approach to review of decisions by
arbitrators is “highly deferential.”305  The court has consistently
held that an arbitrator’s conclusions of law, including those related
to the meaning of a contract, are not reviewable except as to issues
of arbitrability.306  Thus, the RUAA does not conflict with Alaska
law regarding the standard of review.307
4. Remedies.  Unlike the original UAA, the RUAA explicitly
grants the arbitrator authority to award attorney’s fees and puni-
tive damages.  The safe-harbor provision of section 21 provides
that the arbitrator may award punitive damages and attorney’s fees
301. RUAA § 10(a)-(c).
302. 563 P.2d at 254-55.
303. RUAA § 23 cmt. B(1).
304. See Heinsz, supra note 26, at 27-28 (discussing debate over whether to in-
clude opt-in provision).
305. See, e.g., Butler v. Dunlap, 931 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam).
306. See, e.g., Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d 657, 661
(Alaska 1995).
307. The Drafting Committee also considered and rejected two other possible
grounds for vacatur: for reasons of public policy, an approach adopted in several
other jurisdictions, and for “manifest disregard of the law.”  See supra Part III.B.5;
Heinsz, supra note 26, at 32-35.  The Alaska Supreme Court has never considered
either of these grounds for reviewing and vacating an arbitrator’s decision.  Once
again, however, a decision to reject these additional grounds for vacating an award
brings the RUAA in line with the Alaska Supreme Court’s laissez faire approach
to judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision.
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only if “authorized by law in a civil action.”308  When the arbitration
agreement requires the arbitrator to follow the applicable law, then
the arbitrator is required to apply the law correctly, despite the
previously mentioned standards of review.309  Thus, the arbitrator
would not be allowed to award either attorney’s fees or punitive
damages that exceeded limitations provided for in Alaska law.  The
RUAA also requires the arbitrator to apply the same standard the
courts would apply in determining the appropriateness of punitive
damages.310  Thus, the arbitrator would have to follow the Alaska
Supreme Court’s standards for punitive damages.311  In addition,
the inherent limitations of the RUAA’s punitive damages provi-
sion would not permit the arbitrator to award punitive damages ex-
ceeding statutory limitations.312
The RUAA provides a final level of protection in not granting
parties the ability by agreement to confer authority on an arbitra-
tor to grant punitive damages, although it does permit parties to
agree to the provision of attorney’s fees.313  One commentator has
308. RUAA § 21(a)-(b).
309. See Pub. Safety Employees Ass’n v. State, 895 P.2d 980, 985 (Alaska 1995)
(finding that the arbitrator violated the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view by failing to correctly apply applicable law).
310. See RUAA § 21(a).
311. Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 296 (Alaska 1983).  The Alaska
Supreme Court observed that in order to recover punitive damages, a party must
prove that the wrongdoer’s conduct was “outrageous, such as acts done with mal-
ice or bad motives or a reckless indifference to the interests of another.”  Id. at
296.  A party need not prove actual malice.  Id.  Rather, “[r]eckless indifference to
the rights of others, and conscious action in deliberate disregard of them . . . may
provide the necessary state of mind to justify punitive damages.” Barber v. Nat’l
Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857, 864 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973)).  Punitive damages must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (Michie 2001).  To
reach this standard, the proponent must “produce[] in the trier of fact a firm belief
or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved.” Buster v. Gale, 866 P.2d
837, 844 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Castellano v. Bitkower, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253
(Neb. 1984).
The Alaska Supreme Court has specifically held that punitive damages are
not available in a breach of contract claim unless the conduct constituting the
breach is itself an independent tort.  Lee Houston & Assocs. v. Racine, 806 P.2d
848, 856 (Alaska 1991).  This standard alone places great limitations on the appli-
cation of punitive damages to arbitration under the RUAA in Alaska, since most
arbitration disputes are contractual in nature.
312. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f)-(h) (Michie 2001).
313. RUAA § 21(b) (permitting arbitrators to grant reasonable attorney’s fees
and other expenses of arbitration “by agreement of the parties to the arbitration
proceeding,” yet failing to provide the same authority as to punitive damages).
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noted that this omission reflects the intent of the Drafting Commit-
tee, as a matter of public policy, to avoid granting a power to pun-
ish that would not ordinarily be bestowed upon private parties.314
Since section 21 is also one of the waivable provisions of the new
Act,315 the parties are still free to dictate the scope of the arbitra-
tor’s authority through their agreements, consistent with Alaska
law.
Section 25(c) also grants the court discretion to award “rea-
sonable attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation”
to a prevailing party in any contested judicial proceeding to con-
firm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award.316  This provision is
wholly consistent with the Alaska Supreme Court’s prior decisions
and the current Alaska arbitration statute.317
5.  Evidence.  Under section 15 of the RUAA, arbitrators
maintain their discretion concerning the admissibility and weight of
evidence while the parties’ rights to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses are preserved.318  This allows the RUAA to re-
main consistent with the Alaska Supreme Court’s emphasis on the
importance of an opportunity for a fair hearing and the cross-
examination of witnesses.319  While section 15 also provides for
summary disposition, an issue not yet addressed by Alaska courts,
it requires that the opposing party be given the opportunity to re-
spond320 and is waivable under section 4.321
Aside from these specific issues, the overall tone and approach
of the RUAA harmonizes well with the Alaska Supreme Court’s
hands-off approach to arbitrability.  One of the common themes
running throughout Alaska jurisprudence is the desire to permit
minimal court interference to further the goal of contractual
314. See Heinsz, supra note 26, at 25 n.144.
315. See RUAA § 4(a).
316. Id. § 25(c).
317. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.140 (Michie 2001) (allowing the court to award
“[c]osts of the application and of the proceedings subsequent to the application,
and disbursements” after judgment “confirming, modifying, or correcting an
award” from arbitration); Marathon Oil Co. v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 972 P.2d 595,
604 (Alaska 1999) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.140 to include attorney’s
fees).
318. RUAA § 15(a)-(d).
319. See Racine v. Dep’t of Trans. & Pub. Facilities, 663 P.2d 555, 557 (Alaska
1983) (preventing use of hearsay evidence in arbitration proceeding where it “de-
prive[s] a party of the right to a fair hearing” and “the right and opportunity to
conduct cross-examination in a particular case”).
320. RUAA § 15(b)(2).
321. Id. § 4(a).
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autonomy between parties.322  While many of the new provisions
would introduce issues not yet addressed in Alaska, they are also
waivable provisions under section 4, thus preserving each party’s
ability to draft an arbitration agreement suitable to its needs.
More importantly, the certainty and flexibility provided for
under the RUAA are a much-needed commodity in Alaska.  Sev-
eral of the previously discussed Alaska cases noted the absence of
any guidance under the UAA, arbitration agreements, or operating
rules of procedure for the applicable arbitration organization.323
While substantively correct decisions, a review of these cases high-
lights some of the inadequacies of an arbitration system that pro-
vides for expediency at the expense of a more familiar and com-
forting approach that parties are accustomed to under traditional
litigation.  The RUAA brings more of these familiar procedures,
such as compelling discovery,324 and providing for consolidation,325
as well as substantive options, such as attorney’s fees326 and punitive
damages,327 into the realm of arbitration with clear guidance so as
to avoid any confusions during the confirmation process.  It also
takes important measures to ensure that parties will continue to
control their own arbitration destiny.
V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Alaska became a state in 1959, some four years after the
promulgation of the UAA by the NCCUSL.  It was another nine
years before the Alaska Legislature adopted the UAA for Alaska.
Certainly, it is understandable that the legislature was not in a
hurry.
Since that time, arbitration has become a viable alternative to
litigation, despite its relative shortcomings.  Alaska has taken steps
to formally embrace arbitration in ways outside of adopting the
UAA, and ADR in general has flourished.328  As we approach an-
other legislative session in Alaska, perhaps it is time for some leg-
islators to seriously consider whether they want to contribute to
Alaska’s growth in arbitration and to the improvement in dispute
resolution services and mechanisms in Alaska.  The original UAA,
322. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 1547 v. City of Ketchi-
kan, 805 P.2d 340, 341 (Alaska 1991).
323. See, e.g., Powers v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 6 P.3d 294, 299-300 (Alaska
2000).
324. Id. § 17.
325. Id. § 10.
326. Id. § 21(b).
327. Id. § 21(a).
328. See generally ADR IN ALASKA, supra note 4, at Part 2.
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while an important leap forward in improving arbitration services
in the 1950s, is now a mere relic that contributes more doubt and
confusion than it does certainty in the modern age of arbitration.
As noted previously, the RUAA strengthens and recognizes
some of the most sacred tenets of arbitration law as pronounced by
the Alaska Supreme Court.  It emphasizes party autonomy over all
things, allowing most of its new provisions to be waived if parties
disagree on issues such as consolidation or the availability of puni-
tive damages.  Even when arbitrators are permitted to consider and
apply these issues, it commands them to act in a manner consistent
with applicable law.  Given the 1997 tort reform movement, poten-
tial opponents can rest assured that the standards required for es-
tablishing punitive damages, and the limits placed on such mone-
tary awards, will remain intact.  Most importantly, parties have
been given the opportunity to fashion more suitable and certain
remedies, where skeleton language under the UAA and judicial in-
ability to act prevailed before.
The authors recommend that the Alaska Legislature adopt the
RUAA in substantial form as soon as possible.  It has already been
over two years since the NCCUSL adopted its final form; let us not
allow the cloud of uncertainty and unpredictability to permeate in
Alaska for longer than necessary.  Certainly, the legislature will
have other fish to fry, but given the RUAA’s codification of the
majority approach to many arbitration issues, and its harmony with
Alaska jurisprudence, this should be an easy bill to pass.  We look
forward to seeing it assigned to a House or Senate Bill number in
the near future.
